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CHAPTER I 
Recently, there has been a great deal of conceptual upheaval in the 
sociology of science. It has undergone, in Kuhn's (1970) terras, a 
paradigmatic revolution. Ironically, Kuhn's description of how 
scientific revolutions occur has played a major role in this revolution 
(Barnes, 1982). The recently deposed paradigm was generally known in the 
specialty as the traditional view of science. Its exemplar was the work 
of Robert Merton (1970) on the norms of science. Its major contention 
was that science yields an epistemologically unique way of knowing 
reality, objectivity. 
The new paradigm is known as the constructivist program in the 
sociology of science. It has two research exemplars, Latour and 
Woolgar's Laboratory Life (1979) and Knorr-Cetina's The Manufacture of 
Knowledge (1981). Its major contention is that scientific knowledge is, 
like all of forms of knowledge, social or subjective in nature. According 
to this paradigm, scientific facts are not objective descriptions of the 
natural world, rather they are social constructions produced by 
scientists during social interaction. 
It appears that the constructivist program is just entering what 
Kuhn (1970) referred to as a period of normal science during which the 
new dominant paradigm in a specialty consolidates its position and 
accumulates supporting evidence. The research reported here may be 
viewed as part of the supporting evidence accumulating under the new 
paradigm. Like the exemplars for the constructivist program (Latour and 
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Woolgar, 1979; Knorr-Cetina, 1981), our research is an ethnographic study 
of a scientific laboratory. There is, however, an important difference. 
The laboratory we observed is a social science rather than a natural 
science facility. The purpose of our research was to discover whether or 
not there are any significant differences in the fact construction 
process between the social and natural sciences. What follows in the 
rest of this monograph is a detailed report of our study. Below is a 
brief introduction to the structure of the dissertation. Chapter II of 
the report contains a review of the literature in the sociology of 
science up to the ascendancy of the constructivist program. The review 
documents the anomalies that led to the overthrow of the traditional view 
of science. 
Chapter III contains a general discussion of the constructivist 
paradigm as well as a detailed description of Latour and Woolgar's (1979) 
exemplar of the constructivist program. This model of scientific inquiry 
forms the theoretical basis for our study of a social science laboratory. 
Chapter IV contains a discussion of the methodological implications 
of the constructivist program and how they impacted our research. The 
research setting and data collection procedures utilized in our research 
are also described here. 
Chapter V contains the results of our study of a social science 
laboratory. Here, we present our account of the social scientific fact 
construction process. 
Finally, in Chapter VI, we discuss how the results of our study of a 
social science laboratory compare to constructivist accounts of 
3 
scientific inquiry in natural science facilities. Several conclusions 
are drawn about the similarities between natural and social scientific 
inquiry. 
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CHAPTER II 
Int roduction 
Until recently, reviewing the literature in the sociology of science 
would have been a simple task. There were just a few theoretical 
statements in the field and even fewer empirical studies. Mulkay 
(1981:2) referred to this time period as the "long neglect of the 
sociology of science". 
In the last decade, however, the sociology of science has in Kuhn's 
(1970) terms, undergone a paradigmatic revolution. The traditional view 
of science as exemplified by the work of Merton (1970, 1973) is no longer 
dominant in the specialty. A new view of science, known as the 
constructivist program has emerged. As a result, a great deal of 
theoretical development and empirical research has occurred. Thus, the 
reviewer's task has become a complex and involved one. One recent review 
of the specialty, Mulkay (1981) filled nearly two hundred pages in 
Current Sociology, and contained a bibliography of over three hundred 
items. Such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this monograph. 
Instead, this review will briefly describe the history of the sociology 
of science and then focus on what the author and other reviewers (Mulkay, 
1981; R. Collins and Restivo, 1983a; H. Collins, 1983a; Knorr-Cetina, 
1983) consider to be major contributions to the sociology of science 
during the period of dominance of the traditional paradigm. We will also 
describe several of the studies of scientific practice that laid the 
foundation for the constructivist program although the paradigm itself 
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will not be described in detail until Chapter III. 
A Brief History of the Specialty 
The intellectual roots of the sociology of science may be traced 
back to the emergence of the entire discipline. Marx, Weber and Durkheim 
were all concerned with the sociological study of science. 
Building on the idealist philosophy of Hegel, Marx (Marx and Engles, 
1946) argued that all knowledge is socially determined. Ideas 
(knowledge) are shaped by the organization of their intellectual 
production in an historical era. Thus, Marx laid some of the 
intellectual foundation for the sociology of science. He did not, 
however, systematically pursue such a line of inquiry (R. Collins and 
Restivo, 1983a). Instead, he focused his attention on the analysis of 
political ideologies as a form of knowledge. 
Weber, too, was specifically concerned with the institution of 
science. In his essay "Science as a Vocation", Weber (1920) suggested 
that scientific knowledge could be understood by analyzing the actual 
equipment used to produce it, such as the microscope, for example. 
According to Collins and Restivo (1983a;186), Weber's 
explanatory objective is to (1) show that certain material and 
organizational conditions can be expected to produce certain ideas 
(or types of ideas) and (2) reveal the historical patterns of change 
in the means of intellectual production. 
Weber's materialist approach, how the use of certain types of scientific 
equipment produces certain types of scientific knowledge, was largely 
ignored by his contemporaries in favor of a Marxist analysis which 
assumed that the "ideas associated with certain economic activities or 
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class interests come to be viewed as the major influence on or causes of 
scientific ideas" (R. Collins and Restivo, 1983a:187). 
Durkheira (1913) also argued that ideas (knowledge) originate from 
and mirror social structures, at least in primitive societies. 
Durkheira's students and followers focused their analyses solely on 
primitive cultures, however, ignoring institutionalized science in more 
modern societies (R. Collins and Restivo, 1983a). 
Although the central idea that scientific knowledge reflects social 
structure is present in the work of Marx, Weber and Durkheira, the first 
forraal analysis of this notion is found in Mannheira's Ideology and Utopia 
(1936). In an attempt to escape the relativist implications of a Marxist 
sociology of knowledge, Mannheira (1936) chose to treat scientific 
knowledge as a special episteraological case (Mulkay, 1979). According to 
Mannheim (1936), scientific knowledge was not relative. It did not 
reflect social structures in the same manner as did political ideologies. 
Mannheim (1936) argued that science and mathematics were exempt from 
sociological analysis because they were objectively produced by a "free 
floating intelligentsia" that existed apart from social structures and 
class interests. 
Oswald Spengler (1926) did not treat scientific knowledge as a 
special episteraological case. Instead, he argued that science and 
mathematics did reflect the cultural and social milieu in which they 
developed. However, as Collins and Restivo (1983a:187) point out, 
Spengler "had very little influence on the emerging sociology of 
knowledge . . . because he did not link ideas to specific social classes 
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or institutions". In other words, Spengler (1926) only speculated about 
the relationship between social classes and scientific knowledge. 
Although Merton (1970), like Spengler (1926), did not attempt to 
link scientific ideas to specific social classes, he did show how 
elements of the larger society affected the growth of science in 
seventeenth-century England. In his doctoral dissertation, he argued 
that science flourished in England during this time period because 
certain tenets of the scientific method, such as rationality, coincided 
with elements of the dominant Puritan value structure. 
Merton's description of the development of science is an example of 
the analytic stance known as the traditional view of science that 
dominated the specialty in this country until the mid-1970s. Merton, who 
became chief spokesman for the traditional view, argued that sociologists 
could study science as an institution but not scientific knowledge 
itself. According to Merton (1970), sociologists were free to study the 
social conditions that facilitate or hinder the development of science, 
that is the normative structure and even the stratification system of 
science as an institution. The products of science (scientific knowledge) 
were not amenable to sociological analysis, however, because they were 
seen to be objective (not the product of any particular social class) and 
not affected by social factors. Like Mannheim (1936), Merton (1970) 
argued that scientific knowledge is a special epistemological case. 
The notion that scientific facts are unrelated to and unaffected by 
social factors became the dominant paradigm in the sociology of science 
in the United States after World War II. This viewpoint had the 
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"unfortunate consequence of making science relatively uninteresting 
sociologically" (Mulkay, 1981:5). Colleagues (Parsons, 1951) and 
students (Barber, 1952) of Merton studied some of the institutional 
aspects of science, but they tended to describe it in general and 
idealized terms. As a result, little empirical work was done in the 
sociology of science during the 1950s in this country. 
In the 1960s, the sociology of science emerged from "a period of 
long neglect" (Mulkay, 1981:6) and the specialty "became a flourishing 
research area" (R. Collins and Restivo, 1983a) due largely to the efforts 
of scholars outside the discipline. Two historians of science, Derek 
Price (1961, 1963) and Thomas Kuhn (1970) played crucial roles in this 
renaissance. 
Price (1961, 1963) turned the sociology of science in a quantitative 
direction. His most important contribution to the specialty was citation 
analysis. By tracing who cited whom in scientific publications, Price 
(1961, 1963) was able to analyze growth patterns and publication networks 
(invisible colleges) in various scientific disciplines. His goal was to 
create what he called "a science of science" and to discover the "laws" 
of scientific growth. In short, "Price's work has provided sociologists 
of science with techniques for empirically and quantitatively studying 
trends and variations in science" (R. Collins and Restivo, 1983a:190). 
Although Price's (1961, 1963) contributions to the sociology of 
science are extremely important, few scholars outside the specialty are 
acquainted with his work. Such is not the case, however, with the work 
of Thomas Kuhn (1970). It is difficult to overestimate his influence on 
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the sociology of science. "His model of scientific change is widely 
known, and his terms 'paradigm' and 'paradigm revolution' have entered 
the common academic vocabulary" (R. Collins and Restivo, 1983a:190). 
The significance of Kuhn's work for the sociology of science lies in 
the fact that Kuhn (1970) demonstrated convincingly (without recourse to 
Marxist rhetoric and ideology) that scientific knowledge is influenced by 
social factors and amenable to sociological analysis. His account of 
scientific revolutions clearly shows that scientists choose between 
competing paradigms in a discipline before there is conclusive scientific 
evidence to support such choices. By reminding us that social factors do 
Influence scientific Inquiry, Kuhn (1970) opened the door for a sociology 
of scientific knowledge. In fact, his work became one of the 
intellectual foundations of the newly emerging constructivist model of 
science. In his own terms, Kuhn's work became one of the anomalies that 
would eventually lead to the downfall of the traditional view of science. 
Contemporary Sociology of Science 
Although current interest in the sociology of science can be 
attributed to Kuhn (1970), developments in the larger society also 
contributed to the resurgence of this specialty. Mulkay (1981) submitted 
that the renewed interest in the sociology of science was due to science 
becoming a social problem in the 1960s and 1970s. Concerns about the 
role of science in society emerged from several sources. 
Thus, it was argued that massive expenditures on military research 
had made the consequences of war between East and West increasingly 
destructive without making the balance of power any less precarious. 
. . . There was also a growing awareness of the environmental 
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damage and social disruption associated with the use of science-
based technologies. ... In short, the idea that the progress of 
science was bound to improve social welfare ceased, during the 
1960s, to be an article of faith. It was in this context that 
systematic studies of social aspects of science by non-scientists 
began to receive official encouragement and general support from 
those who had come to believe that longstanding assumptions about 
the nature of science had to be reconsidered (Mulkay, 1981:8). 
Thus, sociologists of science began to revise the dominant 
traditional view of science and the production of scientific knowledge. 
But as Collins and Restivo (1983a) noted, there was little initial 
agreement about how this was to be accomplished. A proliferation of 
theoretical, epistemological and methodological perspectives developed in 
the sociology of science. Recently, one of these perspectives, the 
constructivist program, has become dominant in the specialty. However, 
some research in the sociology of science is being done outside the 
constructivist paradigm (or at least its connection to the constructivist 
program has not yet been established). Consequently, each of the major 
themes in the current sociology of science will be described below, 
although not all of these areas of inquiry have yielded results that have 
contributed directly to the ascendancy of the constructivist paradigm. 
Mulkay (1981) has identified four major research fronts in the 
modern sociology of science. First of all, inspired by Price (1961, 
1963), a number of social scientists are using techniques such as 
citation analysis to study patterns of scientific growth. Secondly, a 
number of studies focus on inequality and social stratification in 
science. Thirdly, the normative structure of science is a topic of 
concern in the specialty. Finally, as we have mentioned before, the new 
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dominant paradigm in the modern sociology of science is based on the 
contention that scientific knowledge is socially constructed. 
Scientific growth 
Price (1963) did most of the pioneering work in the study of 
patterns of scientific growth. Employing indicators of growth, such as 
numbers of scientists and numbers of research and abstract journals, 
Price (1961, 1963) concluded that science has grown at an exponential 
rate, doubling in size approximately every fifteen years since the middle 
of the Nineteenth Century. Thus, the scientific community has grown very 
quickly, much more quickly than most other social institutions, although 
the rate of growth now appears to be leveling off (Gilbert and Mulkay, 
1982). 
In addition to merely increasing in size, the scientific community 
is also becoming more diverse. The term branching has been used to 
describe this trend toward diversification and specialization in science. 
That is, each major line of research tends to generate new branch 
lines of intellectual endeavour, into which new entrants to research 
and scientists working in declining areas are attracted. Indirect 
evidence for this pattern of growth is provided by the fact that 
scientists change their area of research quite frequently and by the 
increasing multiplicity of specialist journals and recognized fields 
of specialized research (Mulkay, 1981:16). 
In other words, the modern scientific community appears to consist 
of an ever-increasing number of small, highly specialized research areas. 
It appears that these specialized research areas grow and develop in much 
the same fashion that scientific disciplines do. 
The growth of research areas fits the same logistic curve that Price 
has used in describing the growth of new publications in scientific 
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disciplines to which research areas belong. After a relatively slow 
start, both disciplines and research areas exhibit a period of 
exponential growth that is followed by a period of linear growth and 
finally by a period of slow and irregular growth. Science, as a 
whole, consists of hundreds of research areas that are constantly 
being formed and progressing through these stages of growth before 
tapering off (Crane, 1965:12). 
Although there is general agreement about these stages of growth in 
research networks, Mulkay (1981) outlined some of the limitations of such 
a conceptualization. The model does not apply to all research areas. 
For example, some research areas grow so rapidly that it is very 
difficult to identify the various stages of growth. Cancer research is a 
case in point. 
Some research networks are organized around a topic area that 
requires long term observation. The field of radio astronomy is an 
example (Edge and Mulkay, 1976). It often takes years of observation to 
gather enough data to support or refute one hypothesis in this research 
specialty. Thus, such research areas grow slowly. The stage model of 
growth in scientific research networks is viable in most instances. 
There are some limits to its applicability, however. Not all specialty 
areas fit one, single model. 
There appears to be no relationship between this research front and 
the constructivist paradigm in the sociology of science. This is not 
surprising given the fact that the constructivist program focuses largely 
on the behavior of the individual scientist rather than the institution 
of science itself. 
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Stratification in science 
The scientific community is stratified. Individual scientists, 
research specialties, disciplines and even nations are ranked in terms of 
scientific productivity, rewards and resources. At the individual level, 
most of the research literature is produced by a relatively small number 
of scientists. According to Lotka's Law (see Price, 1963), "the number 
of people producing 'n' papers is proportional to 1/n squared. For every 
100 authors who produce a single paper, there are only 25 with two 
papers, merely 11 with three, and so on" (Mulkay, 1981:23). This 
production disparity has been found to exist in nearly all scientific 
disciplines and in all age cohorts among scientists. 
One might expect the reward structure in science to be monopolized 
by this same small number of scientists. This has been found to be the 
case, whatever indicator of scientific recognition is used, from Nobel 
Prizes to citation of research results. 
Inequality in productivity is exacerbated by a tendency to pay more 
attention to the work of eminent scientists than that of rank and file 
researchers. Merton (1973) referred this tendency as the Mathew Effect. 
It leads to "the accruing of greater increments of recognition for 
particular scientific contributions to scientists of considerable repute, 
and the withholding of such recognition from scientists who have not yet 
made their mark" (1973:446). Thus, rewards and recognition in science 
are largely reserved for the scientific elite at the expense of the 
ordinary scientist. 
Inequality in science extends beyond the individual. Hagstrom 
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(1965) noted the tendency among scientists to rank certain disciplines 
above others in terms of prestige and intellectual development. Physics 
is viewed by most scientists as more prestigious than geology, for 
example. The natural sciences are seen by most members of the scientific 
community to be more theoretically and methodologically developed than 
the social sciences. Gaston (1973) found stratification within 
disciplines. In physics, for example, theoreticians have more prestige 
than experimentalists, while the reverse is true in social psychology. 
Scientific academies, universities and research organizations are 
also stratified in the scientific community. Only a few of these 
institutions are considered centers of excellence, and a disproportionate 
number of elite scientists are trained in and work at these centers of 
excellence. While these centers of excellence are usually discipline 
specific, certain universities in the United States such as Harvard, the 
University of Chicago and Stanford enjoy national reputations in nearly 
all scientific disciplines (Gaston, 1973). 
An important consequence of this concentration is that elite 
scientists are more likely to interact with each other than with rank and 
file scientists (Cole and Cole, 1973). Also, Zuckermann (1977) has 
demonstrated the linkage between elite scientists and those who replace 
them in the upper echelons of science. For example, approximately half 
of the American Nobel Prize winners in Zuckerman's sample studied with 
previous winners, and nearly all of them had trained with other members 
of the scientific elite. 
Moreover, members of the scientific elite are responsible for 
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distributing the rewards and recognition that lead to elite status. On 
top of this, the elite scientists working aL elite institutions receive a 
disproportionately large share of research funds from both the government 
and private funding agencies (Mulkay, 1981). 
Science is stratified, and the question is why? Cole and Cole 
(1973) argued that inequality in science can best be explained by the 
functionalist theory of stratification. The core of the functionalist 
account of stratification in science has been summarized in the following 
terms: 
In the research community, there is one well-defined and overriding 
social objective, namely the extension of certified knowledge. 
Professional rewards and facilities are made available to 
specialized research roles, to the individual occupants of these 
roles and to the various kinds of social groupings which compose the 
research community, almost exclusively on the basis of their 
contribution to this objective. Because the work involved is 
exceptionally demanding, not only intellectually but also in calling 
for prolonged dedication and exceptional strength of character, very 
few scientists have the ability to make any really significant 
contribution. Consequently, rewards and facilities are distributed 
in a markedly unequal fashion. But this does not mean there are any 
structural barriers to individual achievement (Mulkay, 1981:28). 
Cole and Cole (1973) argued that the inequality in science is 
functional for the institution. They maintain that the cumulative 
advantage enjoyed by elite scientists helps direct research funds to the 
scientists with the most ability. In addition, elite scientists serve as 
role models for their colleagues and for the next generation of 
scientists. Finally, the scientific elite helps insure that exceptional 
students receive the best scientific training possible. The most 
promising students can choose or be recruited into those elite 
departments, where they will interact with the best intellects of the 
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current cohort of scientists (Cole and Cole, 1973). 
Several sociologists of science have been highly critical of the 
functionalist account of stratification in science. Mulkay (1981), for 
example, has pointed out that functionalist sociologists of science have 
assumed, rather than empirically demonstrated, that the distribution of 
rewards in science is based on a universalistic criterion of quality. 
Merton's (1973) depiction of the "Mathew Effect" seems to undermine such 
an assumption. It appears that in some cases, a scientist's reputation 
influences how his/her work is judged by the rest ot the scientific 
community. This tendency to pay more attention to the work of eminent 
scientists than that of less well-known researchers Indicates that 
rewards and recognition in science are largely reserved for the 
scientific elite at the expense of the ordinary scientist. 
Another assumption made by functionalist sociologists of science is 
that the process of cumulative advantage in science works to the benefit 
of science. It concentrates resources in the hands of those with the 
greatest ability. No definitive connection has been found, however, 
between measures of ability, such as IQ tests and scientific achievement, 
as measured by citations and rewards. Analysts like Cole and Cole (1973) 
and Gaston (1978) simply take for granted that those scientists with the 
most ability to do research get most of the research funds. 
Knorr et al. (1978) have argued that organizational and structural 
factors contribute heavily to the marked social inequality in science. 
Based on a large international sample of scientists in various research 
contexts, their findings demonstrated that a scientist's productivity 
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(i.e., number of publications) was largely a function of his/her social 
position in a research organization. Those scientists in supervisory 
positions were significantly more productive than their non-supervisory 
colleagues because of the control they exercised over manpower and other 
resources. Supervisory scientists participated in the research process 
much differently than rank and file scientists. They largely confined 
themselves to identifying and defining research projects that were to 
executed by subordinates. In other words, 
structural factors within the laboratory impinge on the productivity 
of the researcher . . . apart from individual differences in ability 
and motivation. For high levels of formal productivity are closely 
associated with the position of supervisor; and the availability of 
such positions will depend to a considerable degree on the structure 
of social relations within the research group and upon the 
institutional system within which it is embedded (Mulkay, 1981:38). 
Gilbert's (1977) analysis of the field of radar meteor studies also 
indicated that social factors effect levels of scientific productivity. 
The leaders of various research groups in the field had much more 
successful careers than those of their followers. Gilbert (1977) also 
found that entry into the field at an opportune time had a strong 
influence on scientists' careers. 
Thus, it appears that structural barriers to individual achievement 
do exist in science and that they have a significant impact on scientific 
productivity. Social inequality in science is not necessarily due to 
differences in individual ability, as traditional sociologists of science 
contend. Rather, stratification in science is in part, structurally 
created. The discovery of structural barriers to individual achievement 
in science is one of the research anomalies produced by constructivist 
18 
sociologists of science that contributed to the downfall of the 
traditional view of science. 
In summary, science is stratified at all levels of analysis. 
Traditional sociologists of science have asserted that this marked 
Inequality is functional and that there are no structural barriers to 
individual achievement in science. Recent research, however, has raised 
serious questions about the accuracy of the functionalist explanation of 
stratification in science. It seems that some of the inequality in 
science is structurally created and that some scientists benefit from 
this inequality at the expense of others. These findings constitute one 
of the anomalies discovered by constructivist sociologists that 
contributed to the downfall of the traditional view of science. 
The norms of science 
Until recently, Robert Merton's (1970) description of the norms of 
science had been considered definitive in the sociology of science. In 
the last decade, however, a great deal of controversy has arisen 
concerning his conceptualization. In this section, I will briefly 
describe Merton's formulation and some df the more important critical 
reactions to his work. 
The norms of science are originality, communallty, 
disinterestedness, humility, emotional neutrality. Individual 
independence and universalism (Merton, 1970; Barber, 1952). Mulkay 
(1981:44) outlined the behavioral prescriptions that accompany each norm: 
The norm of originality requires all scientists to strive 
continually to make genuinely original contributions to the common 
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stock of knowledge. The norm of communality means that 
communications must always be full and open; secrecy is forbidden by 
this norm. Most of the remaining norms deal with the various 
possible threats to scientific objectivity. The norm of 
disinterestedness ensures, as far as possible, that the pressures of 
self interest will be controlled. The temptation of intellectual 
pride is restrained by the norm of humility and the natural tendency 
towards dogmatism by the norm of emotional neutrality. The 
possibility that some scientists might use their positions of 
authority to influence others' ideas is minimized by the norm of 
individual independence. And finally, the norm of universalism 
means that the validity and worth of a scientist's research 
contribution will be judged by impersonal, technical criteria, 
uninfluenced in any way by such particularistic factors as the 
scientist's sex, nationality, social origins or university location. 
In other words, if scientists did not obey these norms, scientific 
knowledge might be distorted by personal interests and social factors. 
Thus, if scientific knowledge is to be an accurate account of the natural 
world, such norms must be in operation. 
There has been some confusion concerning the analytic status of 
these norms. Generally, norms are seen as prescriptions for, rather than 
accurate descriptions of, actual human behavior. The question then is, 
are these norms the actual working rules used by scientists or are they 
broad normative principles (similar to values) which, in turn, generate 
more concrete and specific rules. 
Merton (1970) contended that the former is the case; that scientists 
closely conform to the set of norms he outlined. Several recent studies 
in the sociology of science indicate, however, that scientists' behavior 
often deviates dramatically from the Mertonian norms of science. 
Moreover, some of this research indicates that a set of counternorras 
probably exists in science. 
West (1960) gathered data that indicated no firm consensus among 
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scientists concerning the scientific norms outlined by Merton (1970). 
Some of the scientists in his sample had never heard of Merton's 
description of the norms of science. Blisset (1972) concluded that there 
is a condition of normative ambiguity in science. The scientists in his 
sample indicated little commitment to Merton's formulation. In other 
words, the scientists he studied were not sure what, if any, such norms 
existed. Perry (1966) found that the storybook image of science 
contained in Merton's formulation had little or no effect on the everyday 
behavior of the scientists he observed. 
Mitroff's (1974) study of moon scientists indicated that an 
alternative set of norms exists in modern science. According to Mitroff 
(1974), for each Mertonian norm there is a completely opposite behavioral 
prescription. For example, scientists sometimes give verbal accounts 
that closely resemble Mertonian norms when assessing their colleagues' 
and their own behavior. They are just as likely, however, to employ 
verbal formulations that are in direct opposition to the Mertonian norms. 
Consider, for example, the norms of disinterest and emotional neutrality. 
Mitroff (1974) found clear violations of these norms by the moon 
scientists who analyzed the lunar rocks brought back by the Apollo 
astronauts. Instead of being impersonal, these scientists "were 
emotionally involved with their ideas, were reluctant to part with them 
and did everything in their power to confirm them" (Mitroff, 1974:579-
95). 
Mulkay (1981:51), after reviewing the literature on the norms of 
science, concluded that 
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the range of normative formulations available to scientists appears 
to much greater than the Mertonian account implies and, as far as 
one can judge from Mitroff's study or from other empirical data, 
neither of the sets of norms ... is linked systematically to 
rewards or punishments by means of institutional mechanisms. Rather 
they exist as wide-ranging normative vocabularies upon which 
scientists can draw in accordance with the context in which they 
find themselves. 
Some of Merton's students have attempted to defend his 
conceptualization of the normative structure of science by modifying it. 
For example, Zuckerraann (1977) has argued that two classes of norms exist 
in science. There are cognitive (technical) norms such as methodological 
canons, and there are moral norms. Zuckermann's (1977) moral norms are 
identical to those specified by Merton and should, from her perspective, 
be viewed as broad and general behavioral prescriptions. Cognitive 
norms, on the other hand, refer to "the framework of generic 
methodological conventions such as the requirements of logical 
consistency and empirical confirmability or falsiflability" (Zuckermann, 
1977:88). 
Although Zuckermann (1977) managed to make a case for the existence 
of Mertonian norms in science, her analysis does not eliminate the 
paradox raised by Mitroff's (1974) work. It appears that under certain 
circumstances, scientists are required to deviate from cognitive norms in 
order to conform to moral norms. For example, in the field of radio 
astronomy, a cognitive norm exists which directs researchers in this 
field not to publish results until a study is completed (Edge and Mulkay, 
1976). This cognitive norm violates the moral norm of communality that 
dictates full and open communication between scientists. It seems that 
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Zuckerraann has postulated a set of norms which do not require conformity. 
A norm that does not require conformity makes very little sense and is 
useless analytically. 
In ray opinion, the problem with Merton's (as well as his students') 
description of the norms of science is simple. No traditional 
sociologist of science has ever bothered to go and see firsthand what the 
actual, day-to-day practice of science is really like. Rather, they have 
relied on second-hand, philosophical notions (i.e.. Popper, 1943) about 
how science should be conducted and thus, have presented the rest of the 
sociological community with an idealized, inaccurate description of the 
scientific enterprise. 
Some recent research on the normative structure of science is based 
on the direct analysis of what scientists say and do on a day-to-day 
basis. For example, Wynne (1976) and H. Collins (1974, 1975) have 
focused their research on the issue of replication, one of the cognitive 
norms of science identified by Zuckerraann (1977). According to 
Zuckerraann (1977), scientists rarely fabricate experimental results 
because of the fear of exposure when other scientists attempt to 
replicate their results and cannot. Both Wynne (1976) and H. Collins 
(1974, 1975) have shown, however, that what counts as a replication of an 
experimental result is open to negotiation among researchers in a 
particular specialty area. Moreover, the outcome of these negotiations 
is largely dependent on social factors such as a particular scientist's 
position in the hierarchy of a research institute or university. It 
appears that Zuckerraann (1977) was mistaken about the effect of the norm 
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of replication. 
An important implication of these recent studies of the norriiative 
structure in science is that "we can no longer view scientific knowledge 
as following unproblematically from general conformity to a normative 
order" (Mulkay, 1981:65). Instead, we must focus on how scientific 
knowledge is actually produced during the research process. Again, as in 
the case of stratification in science, actual observation of scientific 
practice produced a series of anomalies that the traditional view could 
not satisfactorily explain. These anomalies concerning the norms of 
science also contributed to the downfall of the traditional paradigm in 
the sociology of science. These findings were especially convincing in 
that they directly contradicted the exemplar of the traditional paradigm, 
Merton's work on the norms of science. 
Summary 
In summary, the literature in the sociology of science may be read 
as the development of anomalies or challenges to the traditional view of 
science that led to its downfall and replacement by the constructivist 
paradigm. These anomalies first appeared in the literature on the norms 
of science and stratification in science. In other words, as the 
constructivist paradigm points out, the behavior of scientists is an 
empirical question and the answers to this question must come from direct 
observation of scientists and not from speculation. Most traditional 
analyses of science have been speculative in nature and not based on 
empirical observation of the day-to-day practice of science. In the next 
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chapter of this essay, we will focus on the constructivist paradigm in 
the sociology of science and how research conducted from this perspective 
has focused on the day-to-day practice of scientific inquiry. 
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CHAPTER III 
Introduction 
In the second chapter of this monograph, we noted that traditional 
sociologists of science have treated scientific knowledge as a special 
episteraological case. Scientific knowledge has been viewed as objective 
and thus not amenable to sociological analysis (Mulkay, 1979). This 
viewpoint has been widely criticized in the past decade, however, and an 
alternative account of science has emerged, known as the constructivist 
paradigm in the sociology of science (Collins, 1983). Theoretical and 
empirical contributions to the constructivist program have come from 
several sources, including the sociology of knowledge (Barnes, 1974; 
1982; Barnes and Shapin, 1979; Bloor, 1976) and the history of science 
(Dolby, 1980). Within the sociology of science, important contributions 
to the constructivist program have come from a number of recent case 
studies and ethnographies of research laboratories and institutes (cf., 
Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Knorr-Cetina, 1981). 
The major conclusion drawn by researchers in the constructivist 
program is that scientific knowledge is socially constructed. Scientists 
assign meanings to objects in their environment in the same fashion that 
non-scientists do. Objects in the scientific environment do not possess 
intrinsic meanings (the data do not speak for themselves), and scientific 
knowledge is not an objective description of the material world as 
traditional accounts of science often assume. 
The constructivist view of science is episteraologically relative. 
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Epistemic relativism rejects the epistemic realist (and Mertonian) 
assumption that science is a unique way of knowing about the material 
world. Put another way, relativists view the actual nature of the 
material world as ambiguous for scientists and non-scientists alike. 
Consequently, scientists are forced to attribute meaning to the 
scientific world, to socially construct it, in other words. 
The Constructivist Program 
Exactly how scientists socially construct the material world is a 
subject of some dispute. In other words, there is a great deal of 
theoretical and methodological diversity within the constructivist 
program in the sociology of science. H, Collins (1983) has proposed that 
constructivist research may be loosely grouped into three broad 
categories: core-set studies, fringe science studies and laboratory 
studies. 
Core-set studies 
Core-set studies focus on the general mechanisms involved in the 
production of scientific knowledge such as the scientific method. There 
are two types of core-set studies. 
The first concentrates on demonstrating that the formal "algorithms" 
of science, such as the methods for proper control and performance 
of experiments and their replication, do not fully explain the 
outcomes of passages of research (H. Collins, 1983:273). 
For example, Travis (1981) has shown that the meaning of "experimental 
control" varies from one experiment to another. Wynne (1976) has argued 
that what counts as an experimental disproof is socially negotiated, and 
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H. Collins (1975) demonstrated that experimental replication is socially 
contingent. In other words, since experiments are often very difficult 
or impossible to duplicate in a strict sense, scientists often negotiate 
what constitutes and adequate replication. This negotiation is usually 
influenced by various social factors, such as a scientist's reputation in 
a specialty area or his/her ability to obtain adequate research funds for 
the experiment. In short, the scientific method itself is socially 
constructed. 
"The second type of study concerned with general mechanisms looks at 
the way scientific debates . . . are actually closed in practice" (H. 
Collins, 1983:274). As a rule, scientists tend to support those 
interpretations of a phenomenon that preserve or maintain the maximum 
number of previously existing agreements about related phenomena. In a 
scientific debate, scientists are more likely to support arguments that 
are compatible with extant wisdom than new and sweeping interpretations 
that require drastic reinterpretations of existing data. In a study on 
the theoretical disagreement between the "charm" and "color" 
interpretations of subatomic particles, Pickering (1981) explained "the 
eventual triumph of the charm interpretation as the result of alliances 
forged between charm theorists and a group of mathematicians whose 
technique could be used for charm but not for the color interpretation" 
(Collins, 1983:275). 
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Fringe science studies 
The various tactics scientists use to construct scientific knowledge 
are often most obvious in what H. Collins (1983) has referred to as 
fringe science. Fringe sciences are those disciplines which natural and 
physical scientists tend to dismiss as methodologically "soft" or even 
fraudulent, for example, parapsychology (H. Collins and Pinch, 1979) or 
the study of UFOs (Westrum, 1977). 
Work on fringe sciences has uncovered features remarkably similar to 
those typical of controversy in the hardest areas of science, though 
in the former the attempts to engineer the credibility of claims to 
knowledge are less well disguised. The ferocity of argument in 
fringe science areas ensures that nearly every negotiating tactic is 
available for public inspection (H. Collins, 1983:278). 
In other words, scientists in the "harder" disciplines are usually 
able to remove or hide the evidence of fact construction (Latour and 
Woolgar, 1979; Knorr-Cetina, 1981), whereas researchers in fringe science 
specialties are unable to do so. For example, construction processes in 
the natural sciences such as cleaning the data are seen as evidence of 
unscientific or deviant behavior when done by fringe scientists. 
Laboratory studies 
Laboratory studies focus on the day-to-day, mundane aspects of 
scientific Inquiry. In most of these studies, a single laboratory is 
subjected to intense scrutiny. For example, in one of the most widely-
known of these ethnographies of science, Knorr-Cetina's The Manufacture 
of Scientific Knowledge (1981), Knorr-Cetina spent over a year observing 
day-to-day scientific activity among plant protein researchers. 
According to Knorr-Cetina (1981), science must be understood in the 
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context of research practices which take place In the laboratory. After 
observing those practices, she concluded that It is Inappropriate to 
portray scientists as 
using symbols to describe the real world ... or as subjecting 
descriptive hypotheses to objective test. . . . Instead, the 
process of inquiry appears to be constructive; that is, oriented 
towards "making things work" successfully and embedded in a reality 
which is highly artificial and essentially self-created (Knorr, 
1977:670). 
In other words, scientific knowledge is not an objective description 
of regularly occurring phenomena in the material world as traditional 
accounts of science have assumed. It seems that nature is largely 
excluded from the laboratory. 
It is clear that measurement instruments and other utensils of the 
laboratory are the product of human effort, as are the books 
articles, graphs and printouts which are used. But equally 
preconstructed are the source materials which scientists manipulate." 
Plants and test animals have been specially grown and bred, 
substances are multiply purified and have been bought from a 
specialized industry or from other labs. "Raw" materials which 
enter the lab are carefully selected and "prepared" before they are 
used in experiments (Knorr-Cetina, 1983:156). 
Scientific data are human-made, and the meaning of these data for 
scientists is based on pragmatics, "making things work". The scientist 
does not really describe the real world, rather he/she tinkers in his/her 
own world. 
What happens during the fact construction process has an impact on 
the end result, the attributed meaning of the scientific data. 
Specifically, Knorr-Cetina (1981) argued scientific work is decision-
impregnated because the use of any technique or measuring device is a 
choice among alternatives. These decisions about what technique or 
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device to use (selections in Knorr-Cetina's terminology) lead, in turn, 
to further decisions or second-order selections. Thus, the products of 
scientific inquiry result from layers of decisions; they are socially 
constructed. Scientific facts may be deconstructed by considering the 
various alternative selections that could have been made during the 
production process. 
The construction process may be described as a series of 
transformations. 
In the laboratory, scientific objects are not only produced, they 
are transformed. They may start off as a smell of some chemical 
reaction or a joke somebody makes, and turn into an "idea" and 
subsequently into measurement data, a "scientific paper" and a 
proven "fact" or the other way around (Knorr-Cetina, 1983:158). 
That is, data are transformed as they move through the scientific 
production process. Knorr-Cetina (1981) likens science to a 
manufacturing process, the manufacturing of knowledge. 
The constructive processes depicted by Knorr-Cetina (1981) have been 
described in more detail in Latour and Woolgar's Laboratory Life. Like 
Knorr-Cetina, Latour spent over a year observing firsthand the everyday 
behavior of scientists in the Salk Institute in La Jolla, California. 
Let us examine their account of scientific practice in more detail. 
One Constructivist Model of Science 
The concept of transformation is the central focus of Latour and 
Woolgar's (1979) study. Latour and Woolgar's (1979) constructivist 
account of scientific practice can be expressed as a formal theoretical 
statement. (See Figure 3.1.) 
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LITERARY (are) TRANSFORMED (into) SCIENTIFIC 
INSCRIPTIONS FACTS 
Inscriptions are Transformations Inscriptions 
data or statements are accomplished become facts 
about data. by adding or de­ when other 
leting modalities scientists are 
from inscriptions. convinced of 
of their 
facticity. 
Figure 3.1. Labour and Woolgar's (1979) constructivist account of 
scientific practice 
They use the concept transformation to describe the social 
construction of scientific facts. The term has two senses. In a general 
sense, the term refers to the process by which literary inscriptions 
(statements about data) come to be regarded as scientific facts. For 
example, Labour and Woolgar (1979) describe how the results of a number 
of bloassays (literary inscriptions) were transformed into an accepted 
description of the chemical structure of a hormone compound (a scientific 
fact). 
A literary inscription (or set of inscriptions) does not become a 
scientific fact in one giant step, however, as this description of the 
process might imply. Rather, an inscription undergoes several specific 
transformations during the fact construction process. In the situation 
discussed above, the results of the bioassays underwent several specific 
transformations before the final description of the hormone compound 
emerged. For example, the results of the numerous bioassays were coded. 
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placed in a computer and statistically analyzed. Each of these steps was 
a specific transformation designed to push a set of inscriptions toward 
facticity (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). 
Initially, all possible literary inscriptions have an equal 
probability of being transformed into a scientific fact. "So the 
objective of the game is to carry out all possible maneuvers which might 
force the scientist (or colleagues) to admit that alternative statements 
are not equally plausible" (Latour and Woolgar, 1979:24). 
Such practical operations change the form and content of literary 
inscriptions (data or statements about data), as the research process 
moves into the final phase of production, report and paper writing. For 
example, the actual details that surround the production of an 
inscription seldom appear in research reports or papers. Rather, some 
idealized version typically appears. 
Latour and Woolgar's (1979) description of their "observer's" 
adventures in the laboratory provides a case in point. It seems that the 
"observer" made several mistakes during the performance of his assigned 
research duties. In one instance, he was supposed to treat a large 
number of biological cultures with a specific chemical compound. He 
found the task to be menial and boring, and sometimes he forgot whether 
he had treated some of the cultures. This necessitated his starting over 
again. Thus, some of the cultures may have received much more of the 
chemical treatment than was called for by the experiment. When the 
"observer" reported his mistakes, the scientists in the laboratory made 
light of his errors and no mention of these mistakes ever appeared in 
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subsequent research reports and papers. 
Latour and Woolgar (1979) argued that social factors determine a 
scientist's ability to effect the transformation of inscriptions into 
facts. These social factors include the credibility of the scientist and 
the circumstances in which he or she is working. All transformations 
occur in an interactional context, involving negotiation among individual 
scientists. An inscription stabilizes as a fact when a network of 
scientists is persuaded of its facticity. 
The credibility of a scientist refers to his or her ability to 
persuade others of the facticity of research findings. It is a function 
of the past intellectual investments of the scientist, reputation in the 
specialty, institutional affiliations, funding support for the research, 
publication outlets and the style in which the findings are presented. 
Latour and Woolgar (1979) have described how a scientist's 
credibility operated to effect a transformation of an inscription into a 
fact. Two groups of scientists were competing with one another in order 
to be the first to isolate TRF, a hormone compound from other chemical 
substances found in the brain. One group, headed by Guillemin, managed 
to persuade most of the network of scientists conducting research on 
brain hormones that its chemical analysis approach to the problem was 
superior to the physiological approach of the second group. Latour and 
Woolgar (1979) attributed Guillemin's success to his ability to recruit 
well-known scientists to his research team and attract extensive funding 
support for his approach. Thus, reputation and funding support were used 
in the push of one group's work toward facticity, undermining the work of 
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a challenger in this case. 
Another example of the importance of credibility (or the lack 
thereof) in transforming inscriptions into scientific facts appears 
below. 
K and L were counting samples on the beta counter. K is fifteen 
years older than L. 
L: Look at these figures, it's not bad. 
K: Well, believe in my experience, when it's not much above 10, 
it's not good, it's noise. 
L: The noise is pretty consistent though. 
K; It does not change much, but with this noise you can't convince 
people. ... I mean good people (Latour and Woolgar, 1979:200). 
In this particular case, L, perhaps because of the age difference between 
himself and K (a rough indicator of relative position in the scientific 
community), did not possess enough credibility (experience) to persuade K 
that the inscriptions obtained from the beta counter were stable enough 
to moved along in the fact construction process. Thus, no transformation 
occurred. What might have become a scientific fact was dismissed as 
noise. 
A scientist's ability to effect the transformation of inscriptions 
into facts is also dependent, in part, upon the circumstances under which 
he or she is working. Circumstances, according to Latour and Woolgar 
(1979), refer to all the contingencies that surround the research 
process. Circumstances include differential access to research equipment 
and facilities, local data-gathering techniques and quirks, and even, in 
some cases, luck. Some possible effects of circumstances on scientific 
research are illustrated below. 
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For scientist D (who had arrived at the institute a few months 
earlier), the existence of K's laboratory represented a tremendous 
opportunity, since such resources were quite scarce. D had no 
trouble using the laboratory for the first time, since K was 
interested in observing his procedure and acquainting his staff with 
it. On the second occasion, D tried to gain access to K's 
laboratory without K's knowledge, since it was well-known that K 
insisted he be a co-author of all papers based on research done in 
his facilities. D's "excuse" was that he had run out of protein: 
his actual intent was to add a very important step to the procedure 
which would alter the color and biological value of his recovered 
protein. When K was officially asked for "his" laboratory, he threw 
up the expected roadblocks, finally agreeing to a lab date that left 
K too little time for preparation. With the aid of co-workers, K 
made sure that D adhered to the exact procedure he had used 
initially. D tried to either smuggle his step into the procedure or 
negotiate with the laboratory staff for its inclusion but failed. 
As a result, he had to abandon his original plans (Knorr-Cetina, 
1979:358-359). 
The example above points out the ubiquitous nature of circumstances 
in the practice of science. Other scientists often present more problems 
than the research question itself. Under different circumstances, D's 
research may have been facilitated rather than hindered by the behavior 
of his colleagues. 
Latour and Woolgar's (1979) constructivist account of scientific 
inquiry may be summarized in the following terms. Scientific facts are 
constructed in the laboratory through various social processes, involving 
credibility, circumstances and negotiations over what constitutes reality 
among scientists. The objective is to make any possible challenge to 
research findings costly, so costly that challenges become less probable. 
Resources such as credibility, access to expensive equipment, help from 
colleagues and esoteric research skills work in this direction. In the 
process, initial observations and measurements in the laboratory are 
transformed into new modes of presentation for the sake of persuasion. 
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The scientific facts presented in papers and ultimately accepted by 
others are not descriptions of the material world, rather they are social 
constructions manufactured by scientists at work in laboratories. 
The constructivist account of scientific inquiry as exemplified by 
the work of Latour and Woolgar (1979) will serve as the theoretical point 
of departure for the issues discussed in the remainder of this monograph. 
Our aim is not to "test" Latour and Woolgar's (1979) model of scientific 
inquiry if such an undertaking is possible in the first place. Rather, 
we wish to utilize their notions as a set of sensitizing concepts which 
might aid us in formulating a reasonable account of the fact construction 
process in a community development laboratory. We are utilizing Latour 
and Woolgar's (1979) model in this fashion because the laboratory we 
observed conducts applied rather than basic or pure research. Thus, 
there may be significant differences in how scientific facts are 
constructed in basic research laboratories (such as the Salk Institute) 
as opposed to applied research facilities. Recently, sociologists have 
conceptualized the differences between basic and applied research in 
terras of the two-communities metaphor (Caplan, 1979; Dunn, 1980). 
Basically, they have argued that basic research is discipline oriented 
whereas applied research is client centered. According to Dunn 
(1980:516), 
The social science and policy making communities may be viewed as 
subcultures or "epistemic communities" whose views about the cogency 
of knowledge claims are a function of differences in social 
organization (authority, power, and incentive structures) and the 
particular "reality tests" applied by members of a community to 
appraise knowledge in particular contexts. 
37 
In other words, what counts as a scientific fact in basic or discipline 
oriented research may not be viewed as such in an applied context. There 
may also be differences in the fact construction process itself in basic 
research as opposed to applied inquiry. Consequently, we suspect that 
there may be some difficulty involved in directly applying Latour and 
Woolgar's (1979) model of the fact construction process to a laboratory 
that conducts applied research. Thus, we are using Latour and Woolgar's 
(1979) ideas as a set of sensitizing concepts rather than just applying 
their ideas to the research conducted in a community development 
laboratory. We will return to the two-communities notion as a possible 
explanation for the differences in the fact construction process in the 
results chapter of this report. Before we offer our account of the fact 
construction process in the social sciences, however, it is necessary to 
describe the research setting and data collection procedures utilized in 
this study. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we will describe the research methods we used to 
study the fact construction process in a social science laboratory. In 
addition, we will describe the research setting and data analysis 
procedures employed in this study. Before we turn to these issues, 
however, a discussion of current methodological practices in the 
sociology of science is in order. 
Constructivist Versus Traditionalist Methods 
in the Sociology of Science 
Constructivist sociologists of science have been highly critical of 
the research methodologies employed by their more traditionalist 
(Mertonian) colleagues. Chief among these criticisms is the contention 
that traditional sociologists of science have relied primarily on 
"removed, secondary sources" and have not "bothered to go and see for 
themselves what actually goes on in science" (Woolgar, 1982:482). Knorr-
Cetina (1981) echoed Woolgar (1982). "We must renounce the services of 
interviewers, questionnaires and statistical offices, and expose 
ourselves, through direct observation and participation, to the savage 
meaning of the scientists' laboratory action" (Knorr-Cetina, 1981:23). 
Woolgar's (1982) and Knorr-Cetina's (1981) point is clear. The most 
appropriate methods for studying the fact construction process in science 
are qualitative and ethnographic. Woolgar (1982) has enumerated the 
advantages of what he refers to as the in situ monitoring or observation 
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of scientific practice. First of all, the sociologist of science who 
employs ethnographic research is able "to base his discussion on first 
hand experiences rather than rely on recollections made in the light of 
subsequent events" (Woolgar, 1982:484). Another advantage is that "the 
study of science as it happens enables the analyst to bypass intermediary 
constructions arising from reliance on informants in situations removed 
from their everyday working environment" (Woolgar, 1982:484). The 
advantages of direct observation of scientific practice stem from the 
notion: 
that more is to be gained from being on the spot than from 
attempting interpretation from a secondary perspective. The in situ 
monitoring of contemporaneous scientific activity thus makes it 
possible to retrieve some of the craft character of science 
(Woolgar, 1982:484). 
Woolgar (1982), Knorr-Cetina (1981) and other sociologists of 
science (i.e., Gilbert and Mulkay, 1982) have argued that science should 
be studied as it happens. Let us examine in more detail exactly what is 
meant by studying science as it happens. 
Some constructivist sociologists of science have interpreted the 
call to study science "as it happens" to mean that ethnographic methods 
are more accurate than research based on secondary sources. On the 
surface, this interpretation is appealing. However, Woolgar (1982) has 
pointed out a contradiction between this interpretation and one of the 
primary explanatory objectives of the constructivist program in the 
sociology of science. 
Adoption of this line of argument for analytic purposes appears to 
ignore the very phenomenon at the heart of scientific activity -
namely, the ways in which different versions and accounts are 
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variously taken as "good enough", "inadequate", "distorted", 
"reflecting the true state of affairs", "biased" and so on 
(1982:484). 
In other words, the sociologist of science who interprets "as it 
happens" to mean that his or her account of the scientific fact 
construction process is more accurate than someone else's is implying 
that her or his account has somehow escaped the circumstances of its own 
construction. Put another way, sociologists of science who interpret "as 
it happens" to mean "more accurate" are engaging in a form of analytical 
hypocrisy. Scientific facts are socially constructed according to these 
analysts except for, of course, their own account of the process. In our 
opinion, such an analytic stance is of little utility. We will 
henceforth refer to this non-reflexive conceptualization of the "as it 
happens" dictum as analytically naive. 
Several constructivist sociologists of science (Knorr-Cetina, 1981; 
Gilbert and Mulkay, 1982; Woolgar, 1982) have argued for a more reflexive 
or sophisticated epistemic interpretation of the "as it happens" 
prescription. Knorr-Cetina (1981), for example, distinguished between 
what she has labeled frigid (non-reflexive) and sensitive (reflexive) 
methodologies in the study of science. A frigid methodology is one that 
yields an account of scientific practice that is unaware of the 
circumstances of its own construction. In other words, a frigid 
methodology is analytically naive. 
On the other hand, a social scientist employing a sensitive 
methodology is constantly aware of the constructive nature of his or her 
own inquiry into the scientific fact construction process. By employing 
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a sensitive methodology, the constructivist sociologist comes to 
understand something about the scientific fact construction process from 
two perspectives rather than one. The use of a sensitive methodology 
allows the researcher to learn something about the fact construction 
process in his or her own research as well as in that of the scientist 
under observation. 
Knorr-Cetina's (1981) distinction between frigid and sensitive 
methodologies in the sociology of science is echoed by Woolgar (1982). 
According to Woolgar (1982), there are two types of ethnographies: 
instrumental and reflexive. An instrumental ethnography is similar to 
Knorr-Cetina's (1981) frigid methodologies described above. It is 
ignorant of the circumstances of its own construction. Instrumental 
ethnographies of scientific laboratories assert that scientific facts are 
socially constructed. They do not acknowledge, however, the implications 
of their assertion for their own inquiry; i.e., that it is also 
constructed. 
Reflexive ethnography is based on a more sophisticated epistemic 
interpretation of the "as it happens" dictum. It does not claim to 
present a more accurate account of scientific practice. Rather, a 
reflexive ethnography continually draws its readers' attention to the 
idea that it is just one of many possible accounts of scientific 
practice. Other possible accounts may be just as appealing and 
plausible. Reflexive ethnographies make no claims to be 
episteraologically unique. 
The utility of a reflexive ethnography stems from its ability to cut 
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both ways analytically. A reflexive ethnography not only tells us 
something about how the scientists being studied produce scientific 
knowledge, it forces the sociologist employing such a method to 
contemplate his or her own constructive strategies. Thus, it is possible 
to gain insight into the knowledge production process from more than one 
perspective. A researcher employing a reflexive methodology sees the 
fact construction process not only from the perspective of an observer, 
but from that of a participant as well. Thus, the use of reflexive 
ethnography can tell us not only how scientific work is similar to social 
scientific work, but also how it differs. In other words, do scientists 
and sociologists construct facts in the same fashion or do they use 
different techniques? From this perspective, a reflexive analytic 
strategy is more fruitful than an instrumental one. 
In summary, the constructivist program implies that participant-
observation and ethnography are to be preferred over more distanced, 
secondary methodologies, such as the survey. This preference is not 
based, however, on the simplistic notion that qualitative methodologies 
yield a more accurate description of scientific practice. Rather, such 
techniques allow for a methodological sophistication based on reflexivity 
that is not possible with secondary data-gathering techniques. Reliance 
on secondary data-gathering techniques precludes the researcher from 
knowing much (if anything) about the circumstances surrounding the 
construction of the data. A reflexive or sensitive methodology allows 
the sociologist of science to learn something about the scientific fact 
construction process in his or her own research as well as in the 
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laboratory under study. This ability to cut both ways analytically is 
viewed by constructivist sociologists of science as superior to the less 
sophisticated methodological techniques employed by traditional 
sociologists of science. 
Unfortunately, employing a reflexive methodology is easier said than 
done. We encountered several difficulties in doing so in our study of a 
social science laboratory. We attributed these difficulties to the 
unique research setting in which our study was conducted and to some of 
the data collection procedures we were forced to employ in order to cope 
with the setting. What follows here is a description of the research 
setting, the difficulties it presented in terras of reflexive inquiry and 
the strategies we used to overcome these difficulties. 
The Research Setting 
Permission was obtained from the director of Commlab (a pseudonym), 
a community development laboratory located in the sociology department of 
a large midwestern land-grant university, to observe in 1983-84 the 
execution of community surveys. Commlab routinely conducts community 
needs assessment surveys at the request of communities in the state. 
According to the director of Commlab, the purpose of these surveys is to 
provide community decision makers with relevant information in order to 
facilitate planning and development activities. 
Commlab community needs assessment surveys usually proceed in the 
following fashion: 
1) Problem Identification 
2) Questionnaire Construction 
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3) Questionnaire Printing 
4) Design of Fleldwork Strategy 
5) Data Collection 
6) Data Editing 
7) Data Analysis 
8) Summary of Results 
9) Feedback and Interpretation 
(Source: Ryan, 1978:8.) 
The first step in doing a survey is identifying what problems or 
topics of concern should be included on the survey. Often, Commlab 
personnel travel to the community to meet with residents concerning these 
issues. Sometimes, however, community residents send their suggestions 
directly to Commlab. This is usually the case when residents of the 
community have a relatively clear idea about what should be included on 
the survey. Typical areas of concern include local schools, community 
services, retail trade, medical facilities and industrial development, to 
name a few. 
Once Identified, these concerns are incorporated into a preliminary 
questionnaire which is evaluated by community residents working on the 
project. After a number of drafts, the survey is pretested on a small 
sample of community residents to make sure that it is clearly and easily 
understood. After the pretest, the final version of the questionnaire is 
returned to Commlab where it is printed. 
During the fleldwork stage of a Commlab survey, a representative 
sample of community residents is drawn and the survey is distributed to 
the sample and picked up from them after completion by community 
volunteers. The return rate for questionnaires is usually quite high, 
averaging over seventy percent in most cases. 
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The completed surveys are then sent to Commlab's offices where the 
results are coded and fed into a computer for data editing and analysis 
purposes. Sometimes, community residents are briefed by Commlab person­
nel on the preliminary results of the data analysis and asked if they 
would like more detailed statistics on certain topics covered by the 
survey. 
Once the data analysis is completed, the results of the survey are 
given to a Commlab employee who authors a summary report of the results 
for the community. This report is then published and disseminated to 
local residents at a meeting or series of meetings held in the community. 
At these meetings, Commlab personnel interpret the results of the survey 
for the community residents and suggest ways in which the information 
might be utilized to improve the community. 
In summary, Commlab community surveys are complex matters, involving 
large numbers of social actors who perform complicated tasks. Thus, in 
order to adequately study Commlab, it was necessary to use a variety of 
methods of data collection. 
Moreover, Commlab is a different type of laboratory than those 
studied by previous ethnographers of science. These differences created 
some major methodological difficulties for our study of Commlab. For 
example, the community surveys conducted in Commlab differ greatly from 
the type of experiments conducted by scientists in the laboratories 
Latour and Woolgar (1979) and Knorr-Cetina (1981) studied. Such 
experiments were described by Latour and Woolgar (1979) as continuous 
research in the sense that once an experiment was started, laboratory 
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personnel worked on it more or less regularly until it was completed and 
the results analyzed. This is not the case, however, with most Commlab 
community surveys. Work on Commlab surveys is much more sporadic and 
intermittent in nature. Some surveys were finished in less than six 
months, while others took well over a year to complete. In one case, no 
work was done on a survey for over six months due to a problem in the 
community. The sporadic nature of work on Commlab surveys made it very 
difficult for us to employ regular ethnographic data gathering 
techniques. During our study of a Commlab community survey, there was 
literally nothing to observe for weeks at a time. 
A second important difference between the research conducted in 
Commlab and that performed in the natural science laboratories observed 
by Latour and Woolgar (1979) and Knorr-Cetina (1981) is that a good part 
of each Commlab survey is conducted in the community, outside of 
Commlab's research facilities. Although we were able to attend most of 
the meetings that took place between Commlab personnel and community 
residents, a lot of the work on the survey we observed was completed in 
the community while we were not present; thus, we were not able to 
observe some aspects of the survey process. Regular ethnographic data-
gathering techniques were not all that effective in this context either. 
Consequently, in order to adequately study the Commlab community 
survey process, we were forced to conduct our study of the laboratory on 
two different levels of analysis. At one level, we observed, as closely 
as possible, one Commlab community survey from start to finish. At a 
second level of analysis, we conducted open-ended interviews with as many 
47 
Comralab personnel as possible about the various states of the Coinralab 
community survey process. The data-gathering techniques we used to study 
each of these levels of analysis are described below. 
Data Collection Procedures 
Two primary methodologies were employed to gather data for this 
study. At one level of analysis, we used participant observation 
techniques to follow one specific Commlab community survey through most 
of the process described above. On a second, broader level of analysis, 
we conducted in-depth, open-ended interviews with as many Commlab 
personnel as possible about the entire community survey process. 
We used the data from these interviews to overcome some of the 
methodological problems caused by the unique nature of Commlab survey 
research. First of all, we used these interview data to construct a 
description of a typical or "average" Commlab community survey. Then, by 
comparing the results of our case study with this generalized description 
of the process, we were able to conclude that the survey we observed was 
representative of the Commlab community survey process as a whole. 
Perhaps more importantly, however, we used the data from our 
interviews with Commlab personnel to "fill in the gaps" so to speak in 
our case study of a single community survey. As mentioned above, the 
nature of the Comralab survey process made the use of traditional 
observational techniques somewhat problematic. In order to overcome this 
"missing data" problem, we used our interview respondents' descriptions 
of the survey process to speculate on what might have occurred during 
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those parts of the survey we were unable to directly observe. 
The case study 
We began our study of the Coraralab community survey process by 
attending several of the meetings that took place between Commlab 
personnel and the residents of Anytown (a small midwestern community) 
during the problem identification stage of the research. These meetings 
were tape-recorded and extensive fieldnotes were taken at all of them. 
During the questionnaire construction phase of the Anytown survey we 
were able to obtain, from Commlab personnel, copies of all the drafts of 
the questionnaire including the initial list of concerns generated by 
community residents and the final draft of the survey that was 
administered to the Anytown residents. 
We also attended and tape recorded the meeting where Commlab 
personnel and Anytown residents designed the fieldwork strategy for the 
survey. We were also able to obtain a copy of the training documents 
used by Commlab personnel to teach Anytown residents how to distribute 
and collect the Commlab survey instrument. 
Our ability to directly observe the Anytown community survey was 
interrupted when the survey reached the data editing and analysis stages 
of the process. The results of the survey were coded and entered into a 
computer for data analysis purposes. From a participant observer's 
viewpoint, the results of the survey disappeared. Although we were able 
to obtain copies of all of the computer printouts of the data analysis, 
our ability to directly observe what happened to the results of the 
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Anytown survey ended at Commlab's computer terminal. 
We were able to resume our observation of the Anytown survey during 
the report writing stage of the process, but this too became problematic. 
Very little was learned from observing the Commlab employee who authored 
the Anytown survey sit at her desk with a computer printout in front of 
her drafting the report. We did, however, obtain copies of all the 
various drafts of the report including the final one that was 
disseminated to Anytown residents. 
In summary, the data we gathered during our case study of one 
Commlab community survey provided us with a detailed picture of certain 
parts of the process. It was necessary, however, to use other data-
gathering techniques, to get a handle on certain other aspects of the 
Commlab survey process. 
Interview data 
In addition to the data gathered from observing the execution of a 
Commlab community survey, we conducted in-depth, open-ended interviews 
with as many Commlab personnel as possible. (A copy of the interview 
schedule appears in the appendix.) With the data gained from these 
interviews, we were able to get a handle on those phases of the Commlab 
survey process that we were unable to observe during our case study of 
the Anytown community survey. 
The personnel interviewed included five professors of sociology, 
ranging in rank from assistant to full, five graduate students and an 
area community and rural development specialist. Several of the 
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interviewees had worked on at least one Comralab community survey from 
start to finish. Others had worked only on certain stages of Commlab 
surveys. For example, one of thp professors interviewed performed the 
data analysis for the reports on over thirty Commlab surveys. Also, two 
of the graduate students interviewed did nothing on the project but write 
Commlab survey reports. Thus, we interviewed both generalists and 
specialists on Commlab community surveys. Table 3.1 summarizes the 
interview subjects' involvement with Comralab surveys. 
Although we interviewed a number of experienced Comralab personnel, 
we did not formally administer the interview instrument to the director 
of Commlab. There were two reasons for this. First of all, the director 
of Commlab was primarily responsible for the questionnaire construction 
phase of the Anytown coraraunity survey we observed. Consequently, we were 
able to observe his interactions with the residents of Anytown directly 
and ask him about the reasons for his actions immediately after meetings 
with community residents. In other words, we did not have to formally 
interview the director of Commlab in order to obtain data on the 
questionnaire construction process; we got what we needed without having 
to rely on the director's recall of events days or months after the fact. 
In this case, informal interaction with the director of Commlab provided 
us with "better" data than a formal interview would have. 
Secondly, by observing and discussing events with the director of 
Commlab as soon as possible after interaction with residents of Anytown, 
we were able to partially avoid the methodological problem of 
intermediate constructions. According to Woolgar (1982), intermediate 
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Table 4.1 Participation on Comralab surveys 
Respondent Number of Surveys Role on Project^ 
(Q) (DA) (R) 
#1 1 1 
#2 20 - 20 -
//3 1 - - 1 
//4 3 - - 3 
//5 8 1 8 2 
#6 4 - 2 4 
//7 35 8 35 8 
//8 1 - - 1 
it 9 15 7 6 7 
#10 8 8 
^(Q) = Questionnaire construction; (DA) = Data analysis; (R) = 
Report writing. 
constructions are accounts of events that are constructed by participants 
in the events after the fact in order to give them meaning within the 
context of the participant's biography. When an interviewer asks about 
these events, the participant relates the account or intermediate 
construction rather than exactly what happened. 
For example, one scientist that Woolgar (1982) interviewed portrayed 
the results of a particular experiment as the culmination of months of 
theoretical preparation, whereas his laboratory assistant told Woolgar 
that the successful experiment was the result of trial and error on the 
part of the assistant. The interviewer in this situation had no way of 
knowing which account of the experiment was accurate. Thus, Woolgar 
(1982) argues that these intermediate constructions should always be 
interpreted with a grain (or several) of salt. In this case, by not 
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interviewing the director of Comralab, we were able to avoid the problem 
of intermediate constructions during the case study portion of our 
research. 
The interviews themselves proceeded from the general to the 
specific. First, background information such as position at the 
university and number of Commlab surveys participated in was obtained 
from the respondents. Then, more specific questions about the 
interviewees' roles on the Commlab project were asked. Each subject was 
asked probing questions about what types of duties they performed on the 
project, where they learned how to execute their job responsibilities, 
who they turned to for help and/or clarification in performing these 
duties and other issues that arose during the interview. The final part 
of each interview was arranged to give each subject the opportunity to 
reflect on and discuss problems, concerns and recommendations related to 
their employment on the Commlab project. 
The Reflexive Nature of this Study 
The multi-level data-gathering approach described above was the 
primary technique we employed to insure the reflexive character of our 
research. By comparing our impressions (constructions) of the Commlab 
community survey process with those of the various Commlab personnel we 
interviewed, we were able to constantly remain aware of the constructive 
nature of our own inquiry. Whenever our interpretation of the Commlab 
fact construction process differed from that of Commlab personnel, we 
integrated those viewpoints into our account of the process. In this 
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fashion, we avoided unreflexively assigning meanings to the events and 
behaviors we encountered during our study of the Commlab fact 
construction process. 
For example, our observations of the Commlab questionnaire 
construction process led us to initially describe this stage of the 
process as uneventful and unproblematic. It appeared that community 
residents almost always went along with the suggestions made by Commlab 
personnel about the form and content of the survey questionnaire. But 
when we compared our impressions of the process with those of the Commlab 
employees we interviewed, we were forced to reflect on and re-evaluate 
our initial characterization of the process. Two Commlab employees had 
pointed out during their interviews that it was extremely difficult for 
most community residents to voice their opinions about the form and 
content of the survey instrument because they perceived Commlab employees 
as "experts" in survey research. Consequently, when the residents of a 
community did say something about an item, these Commlab employees 
usually took the comments very seriously. These Coramlab personnel went 
on to describe the various techniques they used to encourage community 
input during the questionnaire construction stages of the Commlab 
community surveys on which they had worked. 
Using these Commlab employees' account of the questionnaire 
construction process as a starting point, we reanalyzed our 
interpretation of the process and how we came to characterize it as 
unproblematic. Specifically, we combed our field notes (and other data) 
for more subtle evidence of negotiation between Coramlab personnel and 
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community residents during the questionnaire construction stage of the 
Commlab survey we observed. Somewhat to our surprise, we discovered that 
while there was little negotiation about most of the items on the survey, 
certain topics involved a great deal of discussion between Commlab 
personnel and community residents, especially from the perspective of 
community residents. We have since speculated that we ignored (or 
missed) this evidence initially because our training as social scientists 
had desensitized us to the more subtle forms of negotiation used by lay 
persons when interacting with social science "experts". 
Fortunately, the multi-level approach we used in this study allowed 
us enough reflexivity to overcome this misinterpretation of the meaning 
of the events we observed. More importantly, we became much more aware 
of the interpretive nature of the methods we used to construct our 
account of the Commlab survey process. In order to avoid further 
unreflexive interpretations of this sort, we began to view our fieldnotes 
as constructed accounts rather than literal descriptions of what occurred 
during our observations. Instead of taking their accuracy for granted, 
we constantly compared them to the data we obtained from interviewing 
Commlab personnel about the survey process in other communities. Thus, 
we not only learned something about the Commlab fact construction 
process, we learned something about how we went about constructing our 
account of the Commlab fact construction process. 
In summary, two methodologies were employed to gather data for this 
study, participant observation and depth interviews. The use of two 
methodologies allowed us to triangulate on the fact construction process 
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in an applied social science laboratory. By approaching the fact 
construction process from two points of view (the observer's and that of 
Commlab personnel), we were able to adhere to Knorr-Cetina's (1981) and 
Woolgar's (1982) directives that social studies of science should employ 
sensitive and reflexive methodologies. 
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CHAPTER V 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we will present the results of our study of the 
Commlab community development laboratory. We will describe and discuss 
the analytical strategies we used to study the fact construction process 
in the social sciences. Finally, we will speculate on a possible 
explanation for the various types of fact construction processes we 
encountered during our study of the Commlab community development 
laboratory. 
Data Analysis Strategies 
The theoretical and operational model for our study of the fact 
construction process in the Commlab community development laboratory is 
derived from Latour and Woolgar's (1979) constructivist account of 
scientific inquiry. (See Chapter III.) The focal point of their model 
of scientific inquiry is the notion of transformation. Latour and 
Woolgar (1979) use the term to refer to the processes by which literary 
inscriptions (data or statements about data) come to be regarded as 
scientific facts. Thus, the concept connotes some sort of change in the 
meaning of an inscription. According to Latour and Woolgar (1979), a 
transformation occurs when an inscription becomes more or less fact-like 
in nature. For example, an hypothesized interaction between two 
chemicals becomes more fact-like when the interaction is thought to be 
observed during a laboratory experiment. After a successful experiment, 
the inscription is no longer considered "just" an hypothesis; it is now 
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viewed (by at least one scientist, more if the results of the experiment 
are published) as a research finding as well. If the hypothesized 
interaction between the two chemicals does not appear during the 
experiment, the inscription is viewed as unconfirmed and may be regarded 
as even less fact-like than before. 
A literary inscription (or set of inscriptions) does not become a 
scientific fact in one giant step as the previous description might 
imply. Rather, an inscription undergoes several smaller, more specific 
transformations during the fact construction process. Each of these 
specific transformations is designed to make the inscription more fact­
like in nature. These specific transformations are more or less 
successful depending on the scientist's ability and the circumstances 
under which he or she is working. 
Operationally, Latour and Woolgar (1979) define this process of 
transforming inscriptions into more fact-like statements as the "deletion 
of modalities". A modality is a statement or phrase that says something 
about another statement in a piece of scientific writing or research. 
The most common type of modality found in scientific writing is a 
qualifying statement about a research finding. Take, for instance, the 
case of a sociologist who conducts a survey on college students' 
attitudes toward abortion. When she presents the results of her 
research, she may qualify them by pointing out that her sample was 
composed of students from only the university where she is employed. The 
caveat concerning her sample is a modality, according to Latour and 
Woolgar (1979). In order to make her statements about college students' 
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attitudes toward abortion more fact-like, she might seek to remove 
(delete) this qualification (modality) about her sample by including data 
from other universities in her research. According to Latour and Woolgar 
(1979), this deletion of modalities from statements is the core of the 
scientific fact construction process, the name of the game, in other 
words. These specific transformations lead, in turn, to more general 
transformations of inscriptions into facts. 
The process described above may also work in reverse. The addition 
of a modality to a statement may serve to make it less fact-like in 
nature. For example, the results of the imaginary research discussed 
above would be viewed as even less fact-like by other social scientists 
if the researcher qualified her findings further by revealing that her 
sample of college students was composed only of males. Thus, the 
addition of a modality to a statement in a piece of scientific writing 
can make it less fact-like, a reverse transformation, so to speak. 
Latour and Woolgar's (1979) definition of the concept of 
transformation served as the starting point for our analysis of the 
social scientific fact construction process. Like Latour and Woolgar 
(1979), we closely examined the numerous documents (i.e., lists of 
community concerns, drafts of the Anytown survey instrument, computer 
printouts of the data analysis for the survey, and drafts of the survey 
report) we obtained during the case study phase of our research for 
examples of specific transformations, additions and/or deletions of 
modalities from inscriptions. Through the use of this comparative 
technique, we were able to trace and analyze the various processes by 
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which the concerns raised during the problem identification stage of the 
Anytown community survey were transformed, on a general level, into the 
fact-like statements contained in the final survey report. In addition, 
we carefully analyzed the transcripts of the interviews we conducted with 
Commlab personnel for other examples of where the addition and deletion 
of modalities made inscriptions more or less fact-like during previous 
Commlab surveys. From these two major sources of data, we constructed 
the following account of the scientific fact construction process in the 
Commlab community development laboratory. The starting point for our 
analysis of these processes was the problem identification stage of the 
Anytown community survey. 
Problem identification; The initial inscriptions 
Using data (field notes, documents and transcripts, tapes of 
meetings) from our case study of the Anytown community survey, we were 
able to reconstruct the initial list of concerns or problem areas that 
were to be included on the survey. (See Fig. 5.1.) This list of 
concerns resulted from a process of negotiation between 31 certain 
residents of Anytown and several Commlab personnel, including the 
director of the laboratory. For example, the notion of doing a community 
survey in Anytown originated with a group of local merchants who had seen 
the retail trade analysis section of a Commlab survey conducted in a 
neighboring community. These merchants decided that such an analysis 
might be of value to them and contacted Commlab about doing a survey in 
Anytown. In turn, the director of Commlab suggested that these merchants 
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might want to broaden the scope of their survey by asking other groups in 
Anytown (such as the school board and the hospital) if they would like to 
participate in the problem identification stage of the survey process. 
The director of Coramlab (and other Commlab employees) also proposed that 
certain other topics, such as community development and local government, 
should be included on the survey as well. Thus, while a number of the 
topics on the initial list of concerns for the Anytown survey were 
proposed by community residents, over half of the topics on the list were 
suggested by Commlab personnel. 
3S3S5SSSS3ASSS3S5S = SS=3S;SSAS3ASSS3S3SSSS = 
Retail Trade (The Community) 
Education/Schools (The Community) 
Recreation, Library, Fairgrounds (The Community) 
Health Care/Public Nursing ' (The Community) 
Community Services (Commlab) 
Local Government (Commlab) 
Housing (Commlab) 
Community Development (Commlab) 
Special Needs (The Community) 
Personal and Social Characteristics (Commlab) 
Community Image (Commlab) 
Figure 5.1. Original list of concerns 
This list, then, contained the initial set (in Latour and Woolgar's 
(1979) terms) of literary inscriptions for the Anytown Commlab community 
survey. These inscriptions then underwent a series of transformations 
into more fact-like statements during the course of Anytown community 
survey. On a general level, they were first transformed into a social 
scientific data-gathering instrument, the Anytown survey questionnaire. 
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Then, the results of that survey were transformed into a report of the 
results of the survey. (See Fig. 5.2.) This process may be viewed as a 
series of production stages in the manufacture (Knorr-Cetina, 1981) of a 
Commlab community survey. 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
Initial Anytown Anytown 
List of Survey Survey 
Concerns Questionnaire Final 
Report 
Figure 5.2. Results of the survey 
What follows here is a description of the nature and types of 
specific transformations we observed during the production stages of the 
Anytown community survey. These specific transformations led, in turn, 
to the more general transformation of the initial list of concerns for 
the Anytown survey into the factual statements contained in the final 
survey report. 
Transformations during questionnaire construction 
Like the problem identification stage of the Anytown survey, the 
production of the survey questionnaire was accomplished through a process 
of negotiation between community residents and Commlab personnel. These 
negotiations centered on the form and content (additions or deletions of 
modalities) of the items that were considered for Inclusion on the 
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Anytown survey. Some of the topics on the original list of concerns for 
the Anytown survey were easily transformed into items on the 
questionnaire and involved little negotiation between community residents 
and Coramlab personnel. For example, the Community Image scale used to 
measure Anytown residents' general attitude toward the sociability of 
their community was borrowed from a Commlab survey conducted in another 
community. This borrowed scale was, however, only briefly discussed 
during one of the meetings that occurred between Coramlab personnel and 
the residents of Anytown. They suggested two small changes in the 
wording of the scale (to make it more specific to Anytown) and approved 
its use with no further debate. 
Thus, the transformation of the community image issue on the 
original list of concerns for the survey into a scale on the 
questionnaire was accomplished with little debate and a minimum of 
negotiation between Commlab personnel and Anytown residents. 
Other topics on the initial list of concerns were also transformed 
into scales and/or questions on the survey with little debate or 
negotiation between Commlab personnel and Anytown residents. And, like 
the example discussed above, most of these transformations involved the 
use of generic or stock sets of scales and questions from previous 
Commlab surveys. These generic questionnaire items were presented to a 
group of Anytown residents who, for the most part, suggest that few, if 
any, changes (additions or deletions) be made. This modus operandi was 
applied to the community services, personal and social characteristics, 
housing, local government and community development topics on the initial 
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list of concerns for the Anytown survey. 
These transformations were accomplished with little or no 
negotiation because these questionnaire items were already viewed by 
Commlab personnel and Anytown residents as facts or fact-like in nature. 
Let us be more specific about what we mean by the terra fact-like in this 
context. The term has two meanings here. First of all, it is difficult 
to conceptualize a question on a survey as a factual statement in the 
usual sense of the terra. Rather survey questions are designed to elicit 
information (factual statements) from those who complete the instrument. 
There is, however, widespread agreement among social scientists about the 
proper format for survey questions. It is this social scientific 
agreement about proper format that we are referring to when we contend 
that an itéra on the initial list of community concerns for the survey has 
been transformed into a more fact-like statement from the perspective of 
Commlab personnel. 
There is also a second meaning for the terra fact-like in this 
context. From the perspective of Anytown residents, fact-like means that 
a questionnaire itéra elicits a desired piece of inforraation from those 
who respond to the survey. Obviously, this definition of fact-like raay 
not always coincide with the social scientific meaning of the term. In 
the examples discussed above, Anytown residents were satisfied that the 
items contained on the survey tapped the types of information in which 
they were interested. And, since it was Commlab personnel who suggested 
that these items be used in the first place, they were already satisfied 
that the scales were in the proper social scientific format. In other 
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words, both parties viewed these items as fact-like in nature. 
On the other hand, the transformation of some of the issues on the 
original list of concerns for the survey into the more fact-like items on 
the questionnaire was much more problematic and involved a great deal of 
negotiation (addition and deletion of modalities) between Commlab 
personnel and Anytown residents. The retail trade issue was a case in 
point. Although the residents of Anytown suggested very few changes in 
the generic instrument Commlab uses to analyze a community's retail trade 
patterns, they attempted to add several items (modalities) of their own 
to this section of the survey. Some of these items provoked a great deal 
of discussion and negotiation with Commlab personnel. The three items 
which caused the most debate between Commlab personnel and Anytown 
residents are listed below. 
Item #1; Do you feel that the local news media provides you with 
the news you are looking for in connection with local 
happenings? 
Yes No Don't Know 
Item tf2: Which of the following media do you use most frequently 
for your shopping? 
Courier Reminder 
Anytown Advertiser 
Meat Empire Guide 
Nextown Advertiser 
Other (specify) 
Item #3; To which radio station do you listen most frequently? 
Anytown 
Anyville 
Nextown 
Nextville 
Other (specify) 
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The only one of these items included on the final survey instrument 
was Item #3. When the Anytown residents helping with the questionnaire 
noticed the deletion of all three of the above items from the revised 
draft of the instrument, they immediately asked the Commlab personnel 
present at the meeting why these questions had been omitted. A rather 
heated discussion ensued, during which the Commlab personnel present at 
the meeting finally managed to persuade the Anytown residents that the 
results of these items could be misused by members of the local media. 
In other words, they were not fact-like in nature; they were 
unscientific. For instance, Commlab personnel argued that the results of 
Item #2 could be used by someone selling advertising to convince a local 
merchant to buy space in his or her publication rather than another. 
Commlab personnel went on to point out that this sort of free marketing 
analysis was unethical, from a social scientific point of view, and that 
Commlab and the residents of Anytown at the meeting could be held liable 
in a lawsuit if such items were allowed to remain on the survey. This 
silenced most of the Anytown residents present, although a couple of 
people continued to argue for the inclusion of Item #3 on the survey. 
These individuals finally managed to convince Commlab personnel that this 
question was different from Items #1 and //2 and could not be easily used 
by local advertisers for commercial gain. In other words, they managed 
to persuade Commlab personnel that this item was social scientific (fact­
like) enough to be included on the survey. 
Thus, the transformation of the retail trade issue into items on the 
Anytown community survey instrument involved a great deal of negotiation 
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between Anytown residents and Commlab personnel, with each side managing 
to convince the other that certain items should or should not be included 
on the survey. In Latour and Woolgar's (1979) words, the addition and 
deletion of modalities from these inscriptions made the items on the 
survey questionnaire more fact-like in nature from the perspective of 
both community residents and Commlab personnel. 
Commlab personnel and Anytown residents also negotiated the 
transformation of other topics on the initial list of concerns into 
scales and/or questions on the survey instrument. Take, for example, the 
education/schools topic. As was the case with the retail trade issue, 
there was little debate over the generic scale that Commlab personnel 
suggested be used to measure Anytown residents' attitudes toward their 
schools. Nor was there any disagreement over the addition of a scale to 
the survey suggested by a teacher in the Anytown school system. _ (The 
scale was designed to measure residents' attitudes toward certain 
recommendations for public education made by the federal government. A 
copy of the scale appears in the appendix.) 
There was, however, a great deal of negotiation over some additional 
questions authored by an Anytown resident who was present at the meeting 
where the questionnaire was discussed. This resident wanted the 
following questions included on the survey. 
Item #1: Have you taken advantage of the Ginger­
bread preschool program available in 
Anytown? Yes No 
Item //2; Are you aware that there is a preschool 
handicapped program in Anytown? 
Yes No 
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The Commlab personnel at the meeting were reluctant to include 
either of these items on the survey. They argued against Item #2 becaus 
they felt that anybody who needed such a program in a community the size 
of Anytown was probably already aware of it. From Commlab's perspective 
including this item on the survey would have made it less fact-like 
(social scientific) in nature. This argument convinced the Anytown 
residents at the meeting that the item should be dropped from the survey 
Commlab personnel argued against including Item #1 on the survey 
because of the wording of the question. They asked the Anytown resident 
who authored it, what exactly she wanted to find out about the preschool 
program. She replied that she wanted to know how many Anytown residents 
knew about the program and if they thought it was needed. The Commlab 
personnel present at the meeting said they had no problem with that and 
agreed to include questions on the survey designed to tap those ideas. 
They appeared on the questionnaire in the following form: 
1. Are you aware of the pre-school Gingerbread 
program available in Anytown? Yes No 
Don't Know 
2. Do you feel that the Gingerbread Nursery provides 
a needed service for the majority of the community? 
Yes No Don't Know 
In summary, the transformation of the education/schools topic into 
items on the survey involved a great deal of negotiation between Commlab 
personnel and Anytown residents. Some Anytown residents were adamant 
about including items on the survey to gather information about the 
Gingerbread Nursery. Commlab personnel were equally as determined to 
make sure that these items were in the correct social scientific format. 
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In other words, there was intense negotiation over these items because of 
a conflict over the definition of fact-like in this context™ 
The retail trade and education/schools issues probably involved more 
negotiation and discussion between Commlab personnel and Anytown 
residents because they were raised initially by Anytown residents rather 
than Commlab personnel. The items community residents designed to tap 
topics were not always in the correct social scientific format from the 
perspective of the Commlab personnel involved and thus required some 
additions or deletions of modalities in order to transform them into 
fact-like items on the survey. Sometimes these changes made the items 
less fact-like in the eyes of Anytown residents and a great deal of 
discussion and negotiation ensued. 
Not all of the items designed by Anytown residents, however, 
required a great deal of negotiation in order to be transformed into 
items on the survey. Commlab personnel made few changes in the questions 
written by Anytown residents for the special needs section of the survey. 
The transformation of these topics from the initial list of concerns for 
the survey into items on the Anytown questionnaire was relatively 
unproblematic. 
In summary, the process of transforming issues from the initial list 
of concerns for the survey into items on the questionnaire was more or 
less problematic depending on whether or not a conflict developed between 
Commlab personnel and Anytown residents over whether an items was fact­
like or not from their respective perspectives. The transformations 
discussed above are, however, only the first part of the production 
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process involved in turning the initial list of concerns for the Anytown 
survey into the fact-like statements contained in the Anytown survey 
report. Let us now turn to a discussion of the second series of 
transformations in this process. 
Transformations during report writing 
As we noted in Chapter IV, our ability to directly observe the 
transformation of issues on the original list of community concerns into 
the fact-like statements contained in the Anytown survey report was 
interrupted by the data processing and analysis procedures used by 
Coramlab personnel. The results of the survey were coded and entered into 
a computer. From a participant observer's point of view, the results of 
the survey disappeared. Although copies of the computer printouts of the 
results of the data analysis were obtained, our ability to directly 
observe what happened to the raw results of the Anytown Community Survey 
ended at Commlab's computer terminal. 
We were able to resume our observation of the Anytown survey during 
the report writing stage of the process. This data-gathering technique 
soon proved to be somewhat unsatisfactory as well. We learned very 
little about the scientific fact construction process by watching the 
Commlab employee who authored the Anytown survey report sit at her desk 
with a computer printout in front of her, drafting the report. In order 
to overcome this problem, we obtained copies of all of the various drafts 
(3) of the report including the final published document. Using these 
drafts, and data about the report writing process from interviews with 
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Commlab personnel who had written previous survey reports, we were able 
to reconstruct how the results of the Anytown survey were transformed 
into the fact-like statements contained in the final survey report. 
We characterized the transformation of the original list of 
community concerns for the survey into the items on the questionnaire as 
a process of negotiation between Commlab employees and Anytown residents 
over the form and content of items on the survey questionnaire. The crux 
of this negotiation process was the competing definitions of fact-like 
held by Commlab personnel and Anytown residents. Anytown residents 
viewed a questionnaire item as fact-like if it tapped the information 
they wanted about various topics of interest to the community. Commlab 
personnel, on the other hand, defined fact-like in terras of social 
scientific adequacy such as correct format and content for questionnaire 
items. 
In the report writing stage of the Anytown survey, the community 
residents had limited ability to negotiate over the form and content of 
the final survey report. In fact, responsibility for the form and 
content of the Anytown report rested completely in the hands of Commlab 
personnel. Specifically, the Anytown final survey report was written by 
a new Commlab employee who had never previously authored such a document. 
This new employee was, like most other first-time Commlab report authors, 
given a copy of the computer printout containing the preliminary results 
of the Anytown survey data analysis and some previous survey reports to 
be used a guide and told to write a report. She had no contact with the 
residents of Anytown until she presented some of the final results of the 
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survey to them during a meeting in the community. In other words, the 
residents of Anytown had no chance to negotiate with Commlab personnel 
over the form and content of the final survey report. The fact 
construction process became the responsibility of Comralab personnel 
during the report writing stage of the Anytown community survey. What 
follows here is a description and analysis of the various techniques 
Commlab personnel employed to transform the results of the data analysis 
into the fact-like statements contained in the Anytown survey final 
report. 
The transformation of the results of the data analysis of the 
Anytown survey into a final report may be best understood as a process of 
interpretation. The starting point for this process of interpretation 
for all of the authors of Commlab reports we interviewed was the computer 
printout containing the frequencies of response statistics for the 
respective surveys. These frequencies were then used to construct 
percentage or cross-tabulation tables that summarized the results of the 
various subsections of the survey. The process is described below by 
several Commlab report authors. 
Interviewer: Describe how you go about writing a Commlab community 
survey report. 
Respondent; First thing I do is develop all my tables. I usually 
develop many more tables than I'm going to use. Almost every set of 
questions will have a frequencies table that gives an idea of the 
general trends in the data and then, depending on the report writer, 
tables will be generated to indicate differences between sexes, age 
groups and income groups, demographic variables in other words. I 
usually draw up a large number of tables and pick out the two or 
three that best describe what's going on. Then I just toss the 
others and write the report around these two or three tables. 
(Respondent //I) 
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Respondent: I was given about four or five previous reports as 
models and then was told to start looking through the data. I 
started making frequency tables just to get an idea of what was 
going on. I didn't start writing until after I had the tables done. 
(Respondent #3) 
Respondent: I guess the first thing that I did was construction of 
tables. I had a list of tables that the community had asked to be 
included in the report. I read the printout and found the material 
appropriate for constructing tables. (Respondent #6) 
Respondent: I have a system that's developed. I get a copy of the 
questionnaire and I just start thumbing through the frequencies and 
write on the questionnaire the frequencies and percentages. In the 
case of scales, I write in the means so I have, in effect, a 
portable data set. I start with a scale or group of questions that 
look good, I come up with a table and I write. At that point, I 
have the chapters structured and I do tables within the chapters and 
then I give interpretation to the tables. (Respondent //5) 
Thus, the first step in transforming the results of a Commlab 
community survey into the fact-like statements contained in the final 
survey report is the construction of tables and graphs. Commlab survey 
report authors use this table construction strategy for two reasons. 
First of all, arranging the data in tabular form simplifies the task of 
incorporating the numerical results of the analysis of the survey into 
the report. Secondly, the presentation of research findings in tabular 
form is more likely to cause those findings to be viewed as factual than 
if they were presented as text in a paragraph. As one Commlab report 
author explained it, "the tabular method of presenting data seems to 
imply that this finding is a fact whereas a sentence about it may appear 
as just an interpretation to the reader of the report" (Respondent #5). 
In other words, presenting the results of a survey in tabular form is one 
of the techniques Commlab personnel use to transform these results into 
the factual statements contained in the final survey report. This 
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tabular transformation technique was used extensively by the Anytown 
survey report writer. The entire Anytown final report is 104 pages in 
length and contains 47 different tables, one table for each 2.2 pages of 
text in the report. 
The data contained in the tables of a Commlab survey report are made 
even more factual when the author of the report interprets it for 
community residents in the text of the report. In fact, these 
interpretations make up most of the text contained in a Commlab community 
survey report. For example, in the Anytown survey report, the following 
table (selected at random) was developed by the author of the report with 
the help of a computer graphics program. 
I d a  G r o v e  r e s i d e n t s  a r e  t o o  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
t h e i r  j o b s  a n d  c a r e e r s  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e .  
I d a  G r o v e  d i s c o u r a g e s  i t s  c i t i z e n s  f r o m  
g e t t i n g  i n v o l v e d  i n  l o c a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  
P e o p l e  i n  I d a  G r o v e  a r c  w i l l i n g  t o  p a r t i c i ­
p a t e  i n  c o m m u n i t y  a c t i v i t i e s .  
M o s t  c l u b s  a n d  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a r e  w o r k i n g  t o  
b e n e f i t  t h e  e n t i r e  c o m m u n i t y  o f  I d a  G r o v e .  
P e o p l e  i n  I d a  G r o v e  s p e a k  f a v o r a b l y  a b o u t  
t h e i r  c o m m u n i t y .  
I d a  G r o v e  r e s i d e n t s  s t r o n g l y  s u p p o r t  t h e i r  
c o m m u n  i  t y .  
P e o p l e  i n  I d a  G r o v e  s h o w  l i t t l e  c o m m u n i t y  
p r i d e .  
in 6 
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The author of the report then wrote the following interpretation of 
the table for the residents of Anytown. 
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Opportunities for participation in community activities appear to be 
rated very favorably by the majority of respondents (Table 4). 
Sixty percent of the respondents say people participate despite 
their 0#.interests in their careers; 84.5 percent feel Anytown 
encourages its citizens to get involved in the community; sixty 
three percent believe people are willing to participate: and 79.3 
percent state that clubs and organizations in Anytown work fc : the 
benefit of the entire community. 
Respondents seem to perceive Anytown as a good community 
for involvement in local activities. This, no doubt, explains 
the fairly high proportion of respondents who view their com­
munity and fellow citizens with pride. Eighty percent of the 
respondents state that residents speak favorably about Anytown 
and 81.9 percent believe that local citizens show community pride. 
Just under two-thirds (61.5 percent) of the respondents feel that 
residents strongly support their community, while 21.2 percent 
suggest that local citizens fail to evidence this support (Ryan, 
1984:7). 
Let us take a closer look at this interpretation of the statistics 
contained in the table. The first paragraph above contains a fairly 
straightforward statement of the percentage of respondents who rated 
Anytown favorably in terms of community participation. No conclusions 
about the meaning of the statistics are drawn by the author of the 
report. Rather, the report reader is free to make his or her own 
interpretation of the data. 
This changes, however, in the next paragraph of the report. Here, 
the author of the report draws an important inference from the data, 
stating that "(T)his, no doubt, explains the fairly high proportion of 
respondents who view their community and fellow citizens with pride" 
(Anytown Community Survey (Ryan, 1984:7)). This statement elaborates on 
the meaning of the data contained in the table, a meaning which is not 
readily apparent. This process of interpretation makes the data 
contained in the table clearer (and more fact-like) to the readers of the 
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report. Moreover, this type of interpretation seems to be standard 
operating procedure when authoring a Commlab survey report as the 
following descriptions of the process indicate. 
Interviewer; Do you make interpretations about what the data 
contained in a certain table might mean? 
Respondent #1: I do sometimes, but I do it very carefully. I never 
go out on a limb because you get burned on these things if you do. 
I say things cautiously. I state things related to attitudinal 
items, I don't interpret how people might act in a given situation. 
I point out religiously that we know attitudes don't predict 
behavior. 
Respondent //3; Oh sure, I mean just as soon as start saying most 
people in Belmond buy their groceries in Belmond, you're making an 
interpretation just by the fact that you're choosing to focus on 
certain aspects of the table and not others. 
Respondent #6: In my first report, I tried to remove as much of my 
interpretation from the report as possible. Then, I realized that 
there is some interpretation involved in the whole process, there's 
certainly some biases and values in the structure of the 
questionnaire. So then, by the last report I wrote, I was 
emphasizing certain areas and I even interjected certain value 
judgments about what priorities the community should adopt. 
Respondent //5; I was told the first time (I drafted the report) 
that you're not saying anything about this, you're just reporting 
how the residents feel. You should be making some interpretations 
about this. So I went back and starting putting some of myself into 
it, at least more of my own interpretations than was in the first 
draft of the report. 
Commlab survey report authors offer interpretations of the data 
presented in tables in the report for two major reasons. First of all, 
the data in these tables do not always "speak for themselves". The data 
in a table may be ambiguous or even confusing, especially to a community 
resident who is not familiar with such presentation techniques. In other 
words, the interpretations of the data authored by Commlab survey report 
writers often make the results more factual by clearing up any 
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ambiguities created by the tabular format of data presentation. 
Secondly, these interpretations also make the results of the survey more 
factual by pointing out possible alternative meanings of the data 
contained in the tables of the report. 
This process, constructing tables and then interpreting them, was 
repeated throughout the writing of the Anytown survey report. Each of 
the major chapters of the report was constructed in this fashion (except 
for the preface, introduction and appendices). 
Let us summarize our account of the social scientific fact 
construction process to this point. The transformation of the initial 
list of concerns for the Anytown survey into the factual statements 
contained in the final report was accomplished in stages. The first 
stage involved negotiation between the residents of Anytown and the 
Commlab personnel assigned to the project. This negotiation centered 
around what was to be included on the Anytown survey and in what form it 
would appear. The items on the initial list of community concerns for 
the survey underwent numerous changes (additions and deletions of 
modalities) in form and content until both Commlab personnel and Anytown 
residents were convinced of each item's facticity. The 
second stage centered around the interpretation of the results of the 
Anytown survey. The results of the survey were first presented in 
tabular form so as to appear more fact-like to readers of the final 
survey report. The data contained in the tables were then interpreted 
for Anytown residents in the text of the final survey report. This 
process of interpretation completed the Commlab fact construction process 
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by clearing up any confusion or ambiguity about the meaning of the data 
for the readers of the Anytown final survey report. 
Data from the interviews we conducted with Commlab personnel who had 
worked on other surveys echo this description of the social scientific 
fact construction process. The steps in the process described above 
appear to be standard operating procedure in the Commlab community 
development laboratory. Given this, the important analytical question, 
becomes why does the Commlab fact construction process take this form? 
One answer (suggested by several of the Commlab employees we interviewed) 
is based on the two-communities metaphor found in the applied social 
sciences literature. 
The two-communities metaphor 
One possible explanation for the negotiative and interpretive nature 
of the Commlab social scientific fact construction process is the two-
communities metaphor prevalent in the applied social sciences literature 
(Caplan, 1979; Dunn, 1980). According to Dunn (1980:516), 
The social science and policy-making communities may be viewed as 
subcultures or "epistemic communities" whose views about the cogency 
of knowledge claims are a function of differences in social 
organization (authority, power, and incentive structures) and the 
particular "reality tests" applied by members of a community to 
appraise knowledge in particular contexts. 
More specifically, the two-communities metaphor illustrates how 
applied social scientific research, such as that conducted by Commlab, is 
torn between the normative demands of the social scientific community 
concerning rigorous research and the demands of the policy-making 
community for usable (and/or useful) knowledge (Dunn, 1980). 
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This tension between doing good social science research and pro­
ducing usable knowledge for the community was most prevalent during the 
questionnaire construction stage of the Anytown community survey. We 
have already described in some detail how Commlab employees and Anytown 
residents negotiated the form and content of the questionnaire items that 
were included on the Anytown survey. The retail trade section of the 
survey was a case in point. The reader will recall how some Anytown 
residents wanted to add a number of items concerning advertising 
practices to the retail trade section of the survey. Commlab employees 
objected to some of these items on the basis that they were unethical and 
unscientific. A period of intense negotiation followed and eventually 
one of the items in question was included on the survey. In this case, 
adhering to the norms of the social scientific community won out (for the 
most part) over the demands of the local community. 
This tension between doing good social scientific research and pro­
ducing usable knowledge for the community is also present during the 
report writing stage of the Commlab community survey process. Most of 
the Commlab employees we interviewed who had written survey reports men­
tioned the tension that existed between presenting the results of a sur­
vey in appropriate social scientific terms as well as in terras that com­
munity residents could understand. One Commlab employee put it this way; 
I did mostly just simple things like crosstabs and I have done 
things like comparison of means because I think community residents 
can grasp such statistics. Sometimes just a list of frequencies can 
be effective too. The problem is that too much beyond that, is what 
can you communicate to them rather than what do you have the ability 
to do (Interview #3, p.9). 
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In summary, the two-communities metaphor current in the applied 
social sciences literature (Dunn, 1980) offers a logical explanation for 
the negotiative and interpretive nature of the Commlab fact construction 
process. The tension between doing good social scientific research and 
producing usable knowledge for the communities they serve is a constant 
struggle for Commlab employees, as it is for most researchers in the 
applied social sciences. 
Summary 
In this chapter, we have presented the results of our study of the 
Commlab community development laboratory. The two major stages of the 
Commlab fact construction process were characterized as negotiation and 
interpretation, respectively. The two-communities metaphor (Dunn, 1980) 
was presented as an explanation for the negotiative and interpretive 
character of the Commlab fact construction process. It appears that 
Commlab community surveys, like other applied social science research, is 
caught between the normative demands of the social scientific community 
for rigorous research and the demands of the communities it serves for 
useable and useful knowledge. In the next chapter, we discuss the 
results of this study within the context of the constructivist program in 
the sociology of science. More specifically, we will compare the results 
of our research with those of other studies of scientific laboratories. 
Thus, we should be able to come to some conclusions about the utility of 
our account of the scientific fact construction process. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Introduction 
In this final chapter of the dissertation, the results of our study 
of a social science laboratory will be discussed within the context of 
the constructivist program in the sociology of science. More 
specifically, we will compare the results of our research with those of 
other sociological studies of scientific laboratories. In this fashion, 
we should be able to assess the utility of our account of the scientific 
fact construction process. 
A Summary of Results of Laboratory Studies 
Knorr-Cetina (1983) has reviewed and summarized most of the recent 
ethnographic studies of scientific laboratories. Her review includes 
Latour and Woolgar's (1979) study of the Salk Institute laboratory, her 
own ethnography of a plant protein research laboratory (Knorr-Cetina, 
1981), Lynch's (1979) observation of a brain science laboratory. Law and 
Williams' (1982) and McKegney's (1981) investigations of biological 
laboratories and Zenzen and Restivo's (1982) study of a chemistry 
laboratory. 
Knorr-Cetina (1983) concluded that, in spite of some differences in 
theoretical emphasis, the laboratory studies she reviewed had a great 
deal in common. These ethnographic studies of science raise 
a series of similar theoretical issues which challenge received 
conceptions of scientific investigation. The first of these issues 
maintains that scientific inquiry may be better understood as a 
process in which the world is constructed rather than depicted. The 
second refers to the indexical and contextually contingent 
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properties of this process of production. A third point challenges 
the notion of scientific communities from a radically participant 
centered perspective which some laboratory studies adopt toward the 
networks of agents within which scientific research is embedded. 
Finally, ethnographies of scientific work challenge the traditional 
distinction between a social and a cognitive (technical) side of 
science, as well as the related distinction between natural and 
social sciences (Knorr-Cetina, 1983:155). 
What follows here is a more detailed discussion of the issues described 
above and how they relate to the results of our ethnographic study of a 
social science laboratory. 
The constructive nature of scientific inquiry 
According to Knorr-Cetina, the laboratory studies she reviewed all 
pointed to "the constructive nature of scientific inquiry" (1983:156). 
The authors of these studies all argue, in one fashion or another, that 
scientific knowledge is socially constructed. That is to say that 
scientists assign meanings to objects in their environment in the same 
fashion that non-scientists do. Objects in laboratories do not possess 
intrinsic meanings, data do not speak for themselves, for example, and 
scientific knowledge should not be viewed as an objective description of 
the natural world as the traditional view of science maintains. 
To argue that scientific knowledge is socially constructed is to 
refer to the artifactual, contextually contingent, transformational and 
self-referential character of scientific inquiry (Knorr-Cetina, 1983). 
The results of our study of a social science laboratory paint a similar 
picture of scientific inquiry. 
Take, for instance, the artifactual nature of scientific inquiry. 
It seems that scientists spend most of their time manipulating artifacts 
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rather than natural objects. According to Knorr-Cetlna (1983:156), it 
is clear that the measurement instruments and other utensils of the 
laboratory are the product of human effort, as are the books, 
articles, graphs and printouts which are used. But equally 
preconstructed are the source materials which scientists manipulate. 
Plants and test animals have been specially grown and bred, 
substances are multiply purified and have been bought from a 
specialized industry or from other labs. "Raw" materials which 
enter the lab are carefully selected and "prepared" before they are 
used in experiments. To the observer from the outside world, the 
laboratory displays itself as a site of action from which "nature" 
is as much as possible excluded rather than included. 
Many of the raw materials that entered the community development 
laboratory we studied were preconstructed or artifactual in nature. For 
example, the data from the Commlab community survey we observed underwent 
a thorough cleaning before they were subjected to any form of statistical 
analysis. Thus, the "raw" results of the survey became artifactual even 
before they were analyzed. 
The process of making scientific observations or measurements also 
reveals the artifactual character of scientific inquiry. Indeed, the 
very results of these processes are artifacts in "that they intercept the 
normal (everyday) course of events" (Knorr-Cetina, 1983:156). Similarly, 
the results of Commlab community development surveys may also be viewed 
as artifactual. The questionnaires used to gather data from community 
residents are not part of the normal, everyday experience of the 
residents who completed them. In this case, the artifactual character of 
natural scientific research is also apparent in social scientific 
inquiry. 
The contextually contingent nature of scientific inquiry also 
reveals its constructive character. What happens during the fact 
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construction process in scientific laboratories has an impact on the end 
result. 
Laboratory work not only involves highly preconstructed tools and 
materials, it also involves decisions and interpretations, or, more 
precisely, it requires selections to be made. Constructive 
operations are decision-impregnated operations in the sense that any 
definition of what is or is not the case, any specification of a 
course of action, of a measurement device or a chemical composition 
is, in principle, a choice among alternative means and courses of 
action (Knorr-Cetina, 1983:157). 
In other words, a scientific fact is the result of a series of 
contingent, sometimes accidental, selections which depend on the material 
and social context of the laboratory in which they were made. 
Latour and Woolgar (1979) use the term circumstances to refer to the 
various contingencies that surround the research process. Circumstances 
include such things as differential access to research equipment and 
facilities, local data-gathering techniques and in some cases, even luck. 
We encountered numerous examples of the circumstantial nature of 
scientific inquiry during our study of the Commlab community development 
laboratory. As both Latour and Woolgar (1979) and Knorr-Cetina (1981) 
have pointed out, the particular equipment used in scientific research is 
often determined by circumstances such as availability or cost. One of 
the Commlab personnel we interviewed noted the effect that a 
circumstantial equipment decision had on the laboratory. 
According this employee, the academic department in which Commlab is 
located opened a microcomputer facility just down the hall from Commlab's 
main offices. The availability of these facilities (along with certain 
cost considerations) influenced the director of Commlab to change the way 
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in which the results of community surveys were processed. Previously, 
the data from Commlab surveys had been keypunched onto computer cards 
which were then fed into a mainframe computer for analysis. Since 
microcomputers became readily available, however, the results of Commlab 
community surveys have been entered into a microcomputer which stores 
them on floppy disks. The data are then uploaded to the university's 
mainframe computer for statistical analyses. Initially, the change from 
card to floppy disks created some problems for the Commlab personnel 
responsible for cleaning the stored data. 
Respondent: Cleaning the data focuses on what I 
consider to be a significant problem 
since we have moved from cards to disks. 
It seems to me that we're having more 
problems with the data. In the last 
survey, half the cases that were sup­
posed to be punched and recorded were 
not. 
Interviewer: Where did they go? 
Respondent: They weren't stored correctly - that's 
my opinion - other people think it's a 
systematic problem with the computer. 
But I believe that one person is re­
sponsible for it. Aside from the missing 
cases, there have been recently, a large 
number of out of range values, things that 
have been punched wrong. It seems to me, 
that is, every item on the survey has 
six or eight out of range values; how can 
you place any type of confidence at all in 
things within that range? I mean you just 
don't know that they're punched right. If 
the range is 1-6 and you're getting a 
whole bunch of sevens and eights, how much 
confidence can you have in the ones and 
the sixes being punched correctly 
(Interview #2, pp. 6-7). 
As we noted in Chapter III, circumstances can affect a scientist's 
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ability to transform inscriptions into more fact-like statements (Latour 
and Woolgar, 1979). In the situation discussed above, the change in the 
way data were stored during some Commlab surveys made the results of 
these surveys a little less fact-like in the eyes of the Commlab employee 
we interviewed. Thus, what happens during the scientific fact-
construction process (such as circumstantial decisions) can have an 
effect on the end result in social as well as natural scientific 
research. 
The constructive character of science is also revealed by it 
transformational nature. According to Knorr-Cetina (1983:158): 
scientific objects are not only produced, they are transformed. 
They may start off as a smell of some chemical reaction or as a joke 
somebody makes and turn into an "idea" and subsequently into 
measurement data, a scientific paper and a "proven fact"—or the 
other way round. 
The results of our study of the Commlab social science laboratory 
support Knorr-Cetina's (1983) characterization of scientific inquiry as 
transformational. The initial list of concerns for the Anytown community 
survey were transformed first into a scientific data-gathering instrument 
(the questionnaire) and then into the fact-like statements contained in 
the final survey report. This transformation process involved a great 
deal of negotiation and interpretation on the part of both Commlab 
employees and Anytown residents. (For a detailed description of this 
transformation process, see Chapter V.) 
Finally, the constructive nature of scientific inquiry also becomes 
apparent when its self-referential character is considered. According to 
Knorr-Cetina (1983:159), "scientific practice, like social practice in 
86 
general, is self referential practice". In other words, scientists, like 
non-scientists, must assign meanings to objects in their environment. 
For example, scientists often negotiate the meaning of a research finding 
by referring to the conditions under which the finding was produced. The 
following exchange between two researchers at the Salk Institute 
illustrates the negotiative character of scientific inquiry. 
K and L were counting samples on the beta counter. 
L: Look at these figures, it's not bad. 
K; Well, believe in my experience, when it's 
not much above 10, it's not good, it's noise. 
L: The noise is pretty consistent though. 
K: It does not change much, but with this noise 
you can't convince people. ... I mean good 
people (Latour and Woolgar, 1979:200). 
The researchers we interviewed during our study of the Commlab 
social science laboratory often referred to the negotiated character of 
their activities. As we noted in Chapter V, Commlab researchers 
continually negotiated with the residents of Anytown about the form and 
content of the survey questionnaire. Commlab researchers also negotiated 
with one another about the meaning of the results of the Anytown survey 
as well other community surveys on which they had worked. These 
negotiations occurred quite frequently according to the Commlab employees 
we interviewed and involved such matters as data collection and cleaning 
procedures and the representativeness of survey samples. One Commlab 
researcher described the misgivings he experienced about the 
representativeness of the sample in a survey report he authored. 
So what happened was we checked to see if the sample could be 
generalized to the community population by comparing the demographic 
statistics of the sample to the demographic statistics of the 
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community through census reports. And it turned out the sample 
greatly over-represented younger people, high income and highly 
educated people. Our sample was younger, they were better educated 
and they made more money than the average community resident 
(Interview #1, p. 4). 
After discovering that the sample was biased, this Commlab employee 
decided not to include a section stand in most survey reports that 
explains to the reader the validity of the sampling procedure. Instead, 
he pointed out to the Commlab researcher in charge of this survey that 
the sample was biased and, after some negotiation, persuaded him that it 
would be misleading to the community to include the material about 
sampling validity in the final report. In other words, Commlab 
scientists, like the Salk Institute researchers described by Latour and 
Woolgar (1979), negotiate the meaning of the data they collect. They do 
not behave as if the results of Commlab surveys speak for themselves as 
some traditional accounts of scientific inquiry maintain. Thus, the 
negotiated nature of Commlab research reveals its constructive nature. 
In conclusion, the results of our study of the Commlab social 
science laboratory support Knorr-Cetlna's (1983) depiction of scientific 
Inquiry as a constructive enterprise. More specifically, the results of 
our research, like other ethnographic studies of science, reveal the 
artifactual, contextually contingent transformational and negotiated 
character of scientific inquiry. The results of our study of an applied 
social science laboratory challenge the traditional sociological view of 
science as a descriptive activity. 
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The contextually contingent nature of science 
In a previous section of this chapter, we briefly touched on how our 
study of the Commlab community development laboratory illustrated the 
contextually contingent nature of scientific inquiry. Let us return to 
this notion in more detail. Our previous analysis focused on the impact 
that local contingencies, such as the availability of computer equipment, 
had on the end result of research in Commlab. But as Knorr-Cetina 
(1983:161) has pointed out, "conditions in the larger environment" can 
also affect the end products of scientific inquiry. For example, in her 
study of a plant protein laboratory, Knorr-Cetina (1981) discovered that 
the existence of an energy crisis led one scientist in the laboratory to 
develop a more energy efficient method of extracting protein from raw 
potatoes. Had the energy crisis not existed, this scientist would 
probably not have developed the more efficient method of protein 
extraction. Circumstances in the larger environment dramatically 
affected the outcome or end result of this scientist's research. 
Conditions in the larger environment had a large impact on the 
Commlab community development laboratory as well. In fact, the creation 
of Commlab itself can be attributed to conditions in the larger 
environment. Commlab is located in a largely rural, midwestern state. 
Several of the communities in this state, particularly the smaller ones, 
suffered population and economic decline during the 1970s. The Commlab 
community development laboratory was created by the state's university 
extension service to help these communities cope with the problems they 
faced by providing local decision makers with timely and relevant 
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information. Had such conditions not existed in the larger environment, 
it is doubtful that Commlab would have been created. In other words, 
even Commlab's existence may be viewed as an example of the contextually 
contingent nature of scientific inquiry. 
On a more specific level, we encountered numerous other examples of 
how conditions in the larger environment affected the end results of 
Commlab community surveys. Oftentimes, these conditions in the larger 
environment were political in nature. In one case, the results of a 
Commlab survey revealed that most residents of a community had an 
extremely low opinion of local political officials. These officials 
attempted to influence how the results of the survey were disseminated to 
the community by asking Commlab personnel to try and present the results 
of the survey in the best light possible. In another community, the 
results of a Commlab survey indicated that community residents were quite 
unhappy with the local hospital. According to the Commlab researcher who 
authored the survey report, a hospital administrator tried to control how 
the results were presented in the report. Although the administrator's 
attempt was unsuccessful, this example, like the previous one, 
illustrates that conditions (circumstances) in the larger environment 
often impact the end results of scientific research. In summary, the 
results of our study of the Commlab community development laboratory 
support the constructivist interpretation of scientific inquiry as 
contextually contingent. 
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The participant-centered nature of science 
The concept of community has long been used by traditional 
sociologists of science to describe the social organizational structure 
of the institution. Most often, scientific communities have been viewed 
as revolving around 
a specialty area and seen as small social systems with inherent 
boundaries and internal mechanisms of integration. Since the 
earliest sociological conceptions of science, these mechanisms have 
been characterized in terms of economic analogies. . . . Here, the 
scientific field is the locus of a competitive struggle for the 
monopoly of scientific credit acquired through the imposition of 
technical definitions and legitimate representations of scientific 
objects (Knorr-Cetina, 1983:164). 
The market analogy of the social organization of science has been 
criticized, modified and, in some instances, rejected by constructivist 
sociologists of science. These researchers have argued for a 
"participant centered" account of the social organization of science in 
which the individual scientist is the primary unit of analysis rather 
than a market economy. 
For example, Latour and Woolgar (1979), have used the notion of 
credibility to focus attention on how the individual scientist, rather 
than a community of researchers in a specialty area, constructs 
scientific facts. They have depicted the individual scientist as a 
seeker" and investor of credibility. Scientists gain credibility by 
producing credible knowledge (scientific facts). This credibility can 
then be invested to produce more credible knowledge which, in a cyclical 
fashion, leads to more credibility for the scientist. Credibility can 
also be exchanged for money, employment, awards and recognition and so 
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on, according to Latour and Woolgar (1979). Other constructivist 
sociologists of science have rejected the economic analogy and have 
argued instead that the interpersonal networks and resource relationships 
that scientists create and maintain with one another are the key to 
understanding the social organizational structure of science (Law and 
Williams, 1982). 
The results of our study of the Commlab community development 
laboratory support the constructivist contention that the individual 
scientist is the most appropriate unit of analysis for understanding how 
the scientific fact construction process operates. According to the 
Commlab employees we interviewed, it is the individual Commlab 
researcher, operating in a network of fellow Commlab employees and 
community residents, who transforms the initial list of community 
concerns into the fact-like statements contained in a final survey. 
Thus, the processes by which these transformations are accomplished, 
negotiation and interpretation, are participant-centered activities. What 
becomes a scientific fact during a Commlab survey is decided by the 
Commlab researcher and the networks in which he or she operates, rather 
then the scientific community, however broadly defined. 
In addition, the scientific fact construction process often extends 
beyond what has traditionally been thought of as the scientific 
community. According to Knorr-Cetina (1983), the scientific fact 
construction process is impacted by such social phenomena as funding 
agency priorities and societal wide environmental concerns. In the the 
case of Commlab, the scientific fact construction process is heavily 
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influenced by the residents of the community who are largely untrained in 
the social sciences. In other words, a sociologist of science who 
attempted to understand the scientific fact construction process by using 
the scientific community as his or her unit of analysis would be unable 
to account for the outside factors that impact the process. Only by 
adopting a participant-centered view of the production of scientific 
facts, can the sociologist of science make sense of the transscientific 
networks and resource relationships that impact the process (Knorr-
Cetina, 1983). 
The social-cognitive distinction 
Traditional sociologists of science (i.e., Whitley, 1972; Weingart, 
1974) have often distinguished between what they refer to as the 
cognitive (technical) and social sides of science. Recently, however, 
constructivist sociologists of science have challenged this distinction. 
According to Knorr-Cetina (1983:168), "the more closely the 'cognitive' 
core of scientific work has been looked at, the more thoroughly a social 
accomplishment it has turned out to be". For example, laboratory studies 
of science (i.e., Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Zenzen 
and Restivo, 1982) have demonstrated the negotiated and interpretive 
nature of scientific practice. These studies have also pointed out the 
contextually contingent or circumstantial nature of scientific inquiry. 
As we have already pointed out in Chapter V and in a previous 
section of this chapter, the results of our study of the Commlab 
community development laboratory support constructivist arguments 
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concerning the negotiated, interpretive and contextually contingent 
nature of scientific inquiry. It seems that social scientific fact 
construction is remarkably similar in process to natural scientific fact 
construction. 
The two-sciences distinction , 
As noted above, the results of our study of the social scientific 
fact construction process are consistent with constructivist accounts of 
natural scientific inquiry. As Knorr-Cetina (1983) has pointed out, 
philosophers and social scientists have long accepted the notion that the 
social and natural sciences are distinct from one another primarily 
because of their subject matter. According to this viewpoint, the 
natural world can be described in terras of patterned regularities whereas 
the vagaries of human behavior preclude such analysis. Numerous 
approaches to the study of human behavior have utilized this distinction 
as a starting point for new methodological techniques; i.e., humanistic 
sociology, interpretive sociology, hermeneutics, etc. Proponents of this 
point of view have assumed, however, that its positivistic picture of 
natural scientific inquiry was accurate. Laboratory studies of science 
have recently exposed this assumption as mistaken. 
These studies have demonstrated the social character of natural 
scientific inquiry. It appears that natural scientific facts are 
constructed in much the same way as social scientific facts, through 
negotiation and interpretation rather than description and explanation. 
Thus, the results of our study of the Commlab social science laboratory 
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empirically support what, up until now, has been speculation on the part 
of constructivist sociologists of science. In other words, the 
traditionally held distinction between the natural and social sciences 
rests on a mistaken picture of natural scientific inquiry. In addition, 
our study of a social science laboratory offers empirical support for the 
similarity between the natural and social sciences. 
Summary 
In this, the final chapter of the dissertation, we have shown how 
the results of our study of the Commlab social science laboratory support 
the constructivist account of scientific inquiry. More specifically, we 
demonstrated that social scientific inquiry, like natural scientific 
inquiry, is constructive and contextually contingent in character and 
that the scientific fact construction process is best understood as a 
participant-centered activity. The utility and significance of our 
research stems from the fact that it provides empirical support for the 
constructivist argument concerning the basic similarities between social 
and natural scientific inquiry. A caveat concerning these claims is in 
order, however, because our account of the fact construction process in 
the social sciences is just that, an account which cannot escape the 
circumstances of its own construction. It would take another study of 
this study to fully detail the constructive and reflexive nature of our 
research. Since space limitations preclude such an effort, a couple of 
examples of the constructive nature of our research will have to suffice. 
One strategy we used to make our account of the fact construction 
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process in the social sciences more fact-like in the eyes of other social 
scientists was the use of both case study and interview data. In this 
fashion, we were able to avoid criticisms that we relied only on 
interview or only on observational data. Thus, we were able to describe 
the fact construction process in Coramlab not only from our perspective 
but from that of Coramlab employees as well. Whenever possible, we 
attempted to present both views of the fact construction process in 
Commlab surveys. From our perspective, it would have been much easier 
(but less convincing) to have focused on one source of data for our 
research. 
A second strategy we used to make our account of the fact 
construction process in the social sciences more fact-like in nature 
involved the comparison of our results with those of other constructivist 
studies of scientific inquiry. In this fashion, we were able to show 
that our results were similar to those of other social scientists who 
have studied scientific laboratories. There is safety in numbers in the 
fact construction process too. 
These are just two of a number of strategies we used to make our 
account of the fact construction process in the social sciences more 
fact-like in nature. In fact, from a reflexive point of view, the two 
examples discussed above may be viewed as fact construction strategies as 
well. Thus, reflexive inquiry is a loop-like process consisting of 
several layers of complexity. We have only touched on that complexity 
here. 
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In conclusion, we began our study of a social science laboratory 
with a review of the literature in the sociology of science. Our review 
described the basic tension between the traditional and constructivist 
accounts of science that has existed in the specialty since Marx, 
Durkheira and Weber first wrote about the institution. 
In Chapter III, we described the constructivist model of science 
(Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Knorr-Cetina, 1981) in detail and documented 
its recent ascendancy in the sociology of science. In Chapter IV, we 
detailed how the constructivist notion of reflexivity was employed as the 
guiding methodological principle for our research. We also described the 
research setting and data collection procedures we employed in our study 
of the Commlab community development laboratory. 
In Chapter V, we presented the results of our study of the Commlab 
social science laboratory which demonstrated the negotiated and 
interpretive nature of social scientific inquiry. Finally in Chapter VI, 
we compared the results of our study with other constructivist accounts 
of scientific inquiry and pointed out the similarities we found between 
natural and social scientific inquiry. 
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